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Kathryn Loncarich* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Alice Walton isn’t like the rest of us.  The daughter of Wal-
Mart founder Sam Walton spent more than $20 million on art in 
a Sotheby’s auction by telephone in a single day, all while riding 
a three-year-old gelding in preparation to compete in the 
National Cutting Horse Association Futurity.1  During her 
struggles to quit smoking, rather than buying packages of 
Nicorette or hypnotist sessions, Ms. Walton purchased Alfred 
Maur and Tom Wesselmann smoking-inspired works of art.2 
In one of the thousands of stores that have financed Alice 
Walton’s $33.9 billion net worth,3 Lisa worked behind the deli 
counter.4  After two years of service and one raise, she made 
$9.10 an hour, $13,000 a year.  “I don’t have underwear without 
 
*Harvard Law School, J.D.; University of Iowa, B.A.  I would like to thank the 
clinical faculty at the University of Baltimore School of Law, particularly 
Michele Estrin Gilman, Leigh Goodmark, Daniel Hatcher, Ben Barros, 
Margaret Johnson, and Keith Hirokawa for their thoughtful feedback and 
advice on this piece.  I also received valuable feedback from participants at the 
Albany Law School Scholarship and Teaching Development Workshop, the 
Clinical Law Review Writing Workshop, and a Works-in-Progress presentation 
at the American Association of Law Schools Conference in Los Angeles, 
California.   I am also grateful for the research assistance of Hannah Levin and 
Katie Walsh. 
1. Rebecca Mead, Alice's Wonderland: A Walmart Heiress Builds a 
Museum in the Ozarks, NEW YORKER, June 27, 2011, at 28-29.  Ms. Walton 
placed nineteenth in the competition, winning a cash prize of almost $13,000.  
Id. 
2. Id. at 33. 
3. Bloomberg’s Billionaires Index, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
4. Alice Hines & Christina Wilkie, Walmart’s Internal Compensation 
Documents Reveal Systematic Limit on Advancement, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/16/walmarts-internal-
compensation-plan_n_2145086.html. 
1
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holes in them,” Lisa said.  “Everyone at work wears T-shirts that 
are threadbare.  I have just enough to eat and get gas to make it 
to work for the next two weeks.”5  Seven months pregnant with 
no health insurance, Lisa was forced to file for bankruptcy.6 
The disparity of wealth in the United States continues to 
widen.  Currently, the wealthiest 1% take a quarter of the 
nation’s income and control 40% of its wealth,7 while over forty-
six million Americans live at or below the poverty level.8  With 
rising food prices, an increasingly competitive rental housing 
market, and stagnating wages, more and more Americans are 
struggling to afford basic life necessities. 
Despite this growing disparity, the American property 
 
5.  Hines & Wilkie, supra note 4. 
6. Id.  If Lisa could afford to travel to Bentonville, Arkansas, she would be 
able to visit the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art; admission is free 
thanks to Wal-Mart’s sponsorship. FAQ, CRYSTAL BRIDGES AM. ART MUSEUM, 
http://crystalbridges.org/About/FAQ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  Walmart has 
recently acknowledged that the wages it has been paying its employees are far 
from adequate by increasing wages for entry-level employees to $9 per hour, 
which will increase to $10 per hour in 2016.  Managers likewise enjoyed a 
modest wage increase to $13 per hour, which will increase to $15 per hour in 
2016.  See Doug McMillon, In Letter to Associates, Walmart CEO Doug 
McMillon Announces Higher Pay, WALMART (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://blog.walmart.com/in-letter-to-associates-walmart-ceo-doug-mcmillon-
announces-higher-pay.  These modest pay raises, however, fall far short of 
providing Walmart employees with a living wage.  Prior to these increased 
wages, the federal government paid Walmart employees approximately $6.2 
billion a year in public subsidies, such as Medicaid, food stamps, energy 
assistance, and child care support.  Even with the new wage increases, entry-
level employees working full time with two or more members in their 
household will continue to qualify for these taxpayer-funded programs.  
AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, THE WALMART TAX SUBSIDY: WALMART’S WAGE 
HIKE TO $10/HOUR STILL REQUIRES LARGE TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES, AMERICANS FOR 
TAX FAIRNESS (2014), available at 
http://www.americansfortaxfairness.org/files/Taxpayers-and-Walmart-
ATF.pdf.  The inadequacy of the Walmart pay raise is exacerbated in urban 
areas that have increased costs of living.  For example, a living wage for a 
single parent of one child in Baltimore Maryland working full time is 
$22.88/hour, in Chicago is $20.86, and in New York City is $24.69.  See Poverty 
in America: The Living Wage Calculator, MIT, http://livingwage.mit.edu/ (last 
visited May 5, 2015). 
7. Joseph Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (May 
2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-
201105. 
8. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 13 
(2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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system has failed to respond adequately to the needs of the poor 
and middle-class.  Property owners enjoy an almost-
unrestrained right to do what they please with their property, 
including rights to prevent others from entering or using their 
property.  While property scholars have argued that this near-
absolute right to exclude is essential to our property system, 
they have failed to adequately analyze the origin of this right. 
Much of our modern understanding of property may be 
attributed to evolution.  Deference to ownership—including 
strong rights to exclude and exclusive use—is not limited to 
humans, but displayed in a wide array of animals.  While 
animals are often in competition with each other for food, 
shelter, and access to mates, many species respect a prior 
possessor’s right to exclusive access to these valuable resources.  
Animals in competition for resources will not seriously challenge 
a prior possessor’s right to these resources, even if such 
resources directly impact the competitor’s fitness.  Failure to 
abide by these ownership rules can lead to grave consequences, 
including physical injury and even death. 
In his essay, “Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of 
Property Rights,” James Krier explores whether property was 
formed through human innovation or evolutionary processes.  
Using evolutionary biology and game theory, he concludes that 
property likely developed through a combination of evolution 
and human design and set forth an outline for a theory on the 
evolution of property.9 
Krier hypothesizes that property rights emerged in our 
biological ancestors as a result of evolutionary forces.  He 
reasons that because humans only began to develop the capacity 
for language and abstract thinking approximately 100,000 years 
ago, “property rights first emerged among early humans as a 
product of defense to possession, rather than as a product of 
design, simply because early humans probably lacked the 
intellectual equipment essential to the design process.”10  During 
most of the last 100,000 years, when humans lived as hunter-
gatherers, they obtained private property rights in food, tools, 
weapons, and habitation as an unintended consequence, rather 
 
9. See generally James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of 
Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009). 
10. Krier, supra note 9, at 157. 
3
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than a product of, conscious design.  Land and its resources, 
however, continued to be held in common.11 
Krier surmises that it was only with the rise in agriculture 
that humans began to consciously determine how to treat 
property.  When agriculture was developed approximately 
10,000 years ago, the status of land “eventually changed from 
communal to individual ownership.”12  Increased farming caused 
people to become less nomadic and settle the land.  With more 
permanent settlement, populations grew, small communities 
formed, and these communities established governing bodies to 
overcome problems that typically arise with communal land: 
shirking and consumption.13  This development, according to 
Krier, was a product of human design, rather than evolutionary 
forces.14  Over the years, these small communities gave way to 
organized nation states and eventually to our modern-day world 
with its complex property regimes. 
This article contributes to the outline of the origin of 
property rights set forth by Professor Krier, by more fully 
analyzing the role of evolutionary biology in the development of 
property rights.  This article focuses on the pre-political 
formation of property ownership and the initial formation of 
concepts of property and ownership.  Expanding on Krier’s 
analysis, this article considers the implications of this 
evolutionary foundation on our modern property regime, 
particularly given the growing chasm between the wealthy on 
one side and the poor and middle-class on the other. 
Part II discusses the growing disparity of wealth in America 
and our property system’s failure to respond to this inequity.  
While current debates among property scholars have attempted 
to address concerns of inequality, Part III discusses how scholars 
have inadequately analyzed the origin of the rights that 
accompany ownership.  Part IV explores the evolution of 
property rights in nature.  The property rights displayed by 
animals in the wild mirror many of our common law property 
rules, and Part V argues that our common law property system 
is based on the same unconscious evolutionary strategy that 
 
11. Id. at 158. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 159.  
14. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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causes the deference to ownership that is displayed in animal 
behavior.  Part VI discusses what this evolutionary foundation 
to our default property rules means for our modern property 
regime. 
 
II. Property’s Modern-Day Problems 
 
American property law protects strong ownership rights 
that significantly disadvantage the poor and middle-class, 
particularly in light of the ever-growing disparity of wealth in 
our country.  The basis for our conception of property is based in 
large part on nineteenth-century Anglo-American common law.  
At the core of property, many have argued, is the right to 
exclude.15  While the right to exclude is not absolute, the common 
law only recognizes very limited exceptions.16  Even though 
there have unquestionably been changes to our property system 
 
15. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 387 (2001).  Most recently, 
information theorists, including Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, have 
argued that the right to exclusion is essential to property.  For information 
theorists, our property system is based on a need for information.  Unlike other 
areas of the law, property rights are in rem, held against the entire world, thus 
“property rights must be communicated to wide a disparate group of potential 
violators.”  Id.  A strong right to exclude others from property efficiently 
communicates to everyone in the rest of the world that they must stay out.  
“Property presents a simple message to the outside world. . . . the dutyholder 
only needs to know that he does not own the asset in order to know that he 
must keep out.  This keeps informational demands on the dutyholder to a 
minimum.” Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:  Form, Context, and 
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1147 (2003).  The idea of possession being 
fundamental to a concept of property, however, is not new.  In the eighteenth 
century, Blackstone famously characterized property as the “sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”  2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  But see Carol M. Rose, Canons of 
Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) 
(Blackstone “was thoroughly aware of . . . pervasive and serious qualifications 
on exclusive dominion.”); David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a 
Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 105 (2009) (characterizing the 
association of Blackstone with “exclusive-dominion view” as “perverse”). 
16. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 747 (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 204 (1965)) [hereinafter The Social-Obligation Norm].  
One exception to the right to exclude that Alexander points out is the common 
law requirement that property owners allow police onto their property to make 
an arrest or prevent a crime from occurring.  Id. 
5
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over the past two centuries, these changes have fallen far short 
of revolutionizing our property system, despite the changing 
needs and growing complexities of society.17  This part explores 
the struggles faced by the poor and middle-class and how our 
property system has failed protect their interests. 
 
A. The Great Divergence 
 
Since the 1970s, the gap between the wealthiest Americans 
and everyone else has continued to widen.  The “Great 
Divergence”—as economists have labeled this period18—has 
been a period of prosperity for the wealthiest Americans and a 
period of decreased wealth for the poor and middle-class.  During 
this period, the majority of Americans have experienced income 
stagnation, a housing price bubble that burst and resulted in 
plummeting housing prices, and an increase in the cost of food.  
The result of this Great Divergence is that the poor and middle-
class have been forced to struggle to afford basic life necessities. 
 
1.   Wages 
 
Despite the economic growth that occurred in the late-1980s 
and late-1990s, the vast majority of income gains went to the 
richest Americans.19  In the 1970’s, the wealthiest 10% of 
Americans received approximately one-third of the nation’s 
income, while in 2010, their share rose to almost one-half of the 
nation’s income.20  Strikingly, the top 1% control approximately 
 
17. See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of 
Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 125 (2013) (characterizing 
property law as having a “conservative core”). 
18. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 124 (W. W. 
Norton & Co. eds. 2007) (Economist and New York Times columnist Paul 
Krugman has referred to this trend as the “Great Divergence”); see also 
TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE:  AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY 
CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 4 (2012). 
19. Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/ 
features/2010/the_united_states_of_inequality/introducing_the_great_diverge
nce.html. 
20. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes and the Great 
Recession:  Recent Evolutions and Policy Implications (Nov. 8-9, 2012), at 20-
21, figs. 1A & 1B (conference draft), available at 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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24% of the nation’s income.21  The middle-class, however, saw 
virtually no income growth.  The average income of the bottom 
90% of Americans has grown only 1% (adjusted for inflation) 
since 1980.22  The poor have fared no better during this time.  
The real value of the federal minimum wage has dropped over a 
quarter in value in the last forty years.23  The effect of the Great 
Divergence on income inequality has been potent.  As economists 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have stated: 
 
[T]he orders of magnitude are truly enormous.  
More than 15% of US national income were 
shifted from the bottom 90% to the top 10% in the 
US over the past 30 years.  In effect, the top 1% 
alone has absorbed almost 60% of aggregate US 
income growth between 1976 and 2007.24 
 
 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2012/arc/pdf/PS.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2015). In 2007, the percentage of total income going to the top 10% 
peaked at 50% and then declined slightly by 2010 to 48%.  Id. 
21. See id.  Some have calculated that the top 1% only control 20% of the 
nation’s income, a slightly lower, but still striking figure.  Id.  Some have 
argued that the richest 1% control as much as 24% of the total income.  See 
Noah, supra note 19. 
22. Jan Diehm & Katy Hall, Inequality in U.S. Is Scarily High, Rising, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013, 9:49 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/inequality-us-_n_3421381.html 
(citing David Cay Johnston, 9 Things the Rich Don’t Want You to Know About 
Taxes, WILLAMETTE WEEK (April 13, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://wweek.com/portland/article-17350%20-
9_things_the_rich_dont_want_you_to_know_about_taxes.html). 
23. CRAIG K. ELWELL & LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INFLATION 
AND THE REAL MINIMUM WAGE: A FACT SHEET 2 (June 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42973.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).  The 
real value of the minimum wage has dropped 26% in the last four decades.  In 
1968, the real value of the federal minimum wage was $10.70, while in 2009 
the real value was only $7.90.  Real value reflects the purchasing power to help 
account for changes in inflation.  The real value used here is reflected in May 
2013 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and 
Clerical Workers (CPI-W).  Id.  While President Obama has set forth a proposal 
to raise the minimum wage to $10.10/hour, this wage is still an inadequate 
living wage to support a family of four or even a single person in many states.  
See Dr. Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage Calculator, MIT (Feb. 2, 2014), 
http://livingwage.mit.edu/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2014). 
24. Piketty & Saez, supra note 20, at 3, Table 2 (noting that similar trends 
are occurring in the United Kingdom and Canada but not in Continental 
Europe and Japan). 
7
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The result of the Great Divergence is that wage earners have 
been forced to be more productive while making the same or 
less.25  Moreover, the decline of union membership due to the 
proliferation of “right to work” laws has left lower- and middle-
class workers with little bargaining power over employers to 
negotiate wages, benefits and hours.26 
 
2.   Housing 
 
The stagnation of wages has made it difficult for the poor 
and middle-class to afford necessities, including housing and 
food.  The rate of homeownership steadily increased until 2007, 
even as the price of housing skyrocketed from 2001 to 2007.27  
The increase in home ownership and home values was 
unquestionably attributable to the emergence of financial 
products, like mortgage-backed securities, in the 1990s, which 
again financially benefited the one-percent.  These products 
allowed investment banks to “legally buy, sell and repackage 
[mortgages] spawn[ing] a secondary mortgage market that 
never before existed.”28  During this same time, credit was 
readily available to homeowners and those looking to purchase 
new homes.  Balloon mortgages were often given to people to 
purchase houses they simply could not afford under a traditional 
15- or 30-year mortgage.29  In addition, these increasing home 
 
25. Susan Fleck et al., The Compensation-Productivity Gap: A Visual 
Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 57 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/01/art3full.pdf; Updated Compensation-
Productivity Charts, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/#tables (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
26. Union membership has declined by 50% from 1973 (24.0%) to 2012 
(11.2%). Twenty-five states have passed “Right to Work” statutes, which 
prohibit union security agreements that require employees to join or pay fees 
to the union as a condition of employment. 
27. ELWELL & LEVINE, supra note 23, at 2. From 1989 to 2001, home 
ownership rose from 62.8% to 67.7%.  Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Melt-
Down and the Wealth of the Middle Class, US2010 PROJECT 2, 3 (May 2013), 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/data/report/report05012013.pdf. While home 
prices increased by 19% from 2001 to 2007, home ownership also increased to 
68.6%. Id. 
28. Lydia R. Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws 
of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2013). 
29. Wolff, supra note 27, at 3.  Sub-prime mortgages are now infamous for 
their exceedingly high interest rates in at the end of a 3, 5, or 7-year period or 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
  
588 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
values allowed homeowners to refinance their mortgages or 
obtain second mortgages to extract more equity from their home, 
leaving them with larger principles on their mortgages.30  As a 
result of this readily available credit, lower- and middle-class 
homeowners became highly leveraged against their homes.31 
The housing bubble burst with the onset of the Great 
Recession.  The median price for existing homes dropped 24% by 
2010, and plummeted by over half in Las Vegas, Phoenix, and 
Miami.32  The widely-held belief that housing prices would 
increase indefinitely turned out to be a fallacy. 
The Great Divergence coupled with the Great Recession has 
significantly impacted renters as well.  With an unstable 
housing market and more stringent financial qualification 
requirements to obtain a mortgage, for many people, renting has 
become more appealing than home ownership.  The increased 
demand in the rental market has brought higher rents and 
limited the availability of affordable housing for many low-
income individuals.  Across the country, an individual working 
a full-time minimum wage job cannot afford the fair market rent 
of a two-bedroom apartment.33  The number of individuals living 
with an extreme rent burden or living in severely inadequate 
housing has increased by 20%.34  In addition, families have been 
forced to double-up; the rate of individuals and families living in 
overcrowded housing rate also significantly increased among 
natural born United States households from 2.21% in 2005 to 
9.83% in 2008.35 
 
balloon payments that were due at the expiration of the loan.  Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. “[A]verage mortgage debt per household swelled by a staggering 
59% in real terms between 2001 and 2007, and the value of outstanding 
mortgage loans as a share of total house value rose from 0.334 to 0.349, despite 
the 19% increase in real housing value.” Id. 
32. Id. at 2-3. 
33. See ELINA BRAVVE ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT 
OF REACH 2012: AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN HOUSING CRISIS 11 (2012), available at 
http://nlihc.org/oor/2012 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). “Affordable housing” is 
defined as rental value of 30% or less of monthly income.  Id. at 4. 
34. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POL’Y DEV. AND 
RESEARCH, WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2009:  REP. TO CONGRESS 1 (Feb. 2011) 
(defining severe rent burden as a tenant paying more than one-half of his or 
her monthly income in rent). 
35. GARY PAINTER, WHAT HAPPENS TO HOUSEHOLD FORMATION IN A 
RECESSION, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM. & MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N. 26–27 
9
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3.   Food 
 
Rising food prices have also affected the poor and middle-
class. According to the United States Census Bureau, over the 
past decade, the costs of regular food items increased more 
rapidly than the rate of inflation.36  The United States 
government estimates that it costs $176.60 each week to feed a 
family of four, amounting to over half of the pre-tax income of a 
worker making the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.37 
The cost of food is exacerbated for residents of poor 
neighborhoods, many of whom do not have access to regular 
grocery stores or fresh fruit and vegetables and are forced to pay 
premium prices for processed foods at convenience stores and 
bodegas.38 
 
B. Property Law’s Failure to Respond to Changing Societal 
Needs 
 
Despite this growing disparity of wealth, the American 
property system had done little to protect the interests of the 
poor and middle-class.  This system is largely based on Anglo-
American common law that protects near-absolute ownership 
rights, including the rights to exclude, use, and transfer 
property. 
 
(April, 2010). 
36. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, PRICES: FOOD COST AND PRICES (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/prices/food_cost_and_prices.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).  For example, in real 2010 dollars (adjusted for 
inflation), from 2000 to 2010, the price per pound of flour has increased from 
$.28 to $.44; the price per pound of ground beef has increased from $1.63 to 
$2.38; the price of a dozen eggs has increased from $.96 to $1.79; and the price 
per pound of apples has increased from $.82 to $1.20.  Id. 
37. Id.  The number cited is based on 2010 data, which is the most recently 
available numbers.  Id.  The government also provides a “thrifty” plan for 
nutritious eating, which is calculated to cost a family of four $135.60 each 
week; this amount is equivalent to just under 19 hours of work for a minimum 
wage worker.  Id.  Given the lack of availability of grocery stores in many low-
income areas, however, it is not reasonable to expect people to be able to abide 
by this plan.  Id. 
38. See ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICES (ERS), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD 
ACCESS RESEARCH ATLAS (March 1, 2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/food-access-research-atlas.aspx. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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With few exceptions, under current American property law, 
a person has the right to acquire as much property as he or she 
can afford.  This person may do what he or she likes with this 
property.  One can hoard his money in a bank or donate it 
entirely to a charity. 
While the law protects strong property rights, there are 
limits.  In one’s home, an individual may run around naked as 
long as the curtains are drawn or scramble eggs at two o’clock in 
the morning while singing the Book of Mormon soundtrack as 
long as your singing does not generate a complaint from the 
neighbors.  The law of nuisance, which is guided by the common 
law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your land 
in such a way as not to injure the land of others), limits what 
owners may do with their property.39  Likewise, owning property 
does not insulate property owners from criminal law; property 
owners may not engage in illegal activity on their property.40  
For example, a property owner may not run a 
methamphetamine lab in his or her house.  Not only is the 
activity illegal, but it is also a nuisance because the fumes and 
risk of explosions endanger the health and safety of one’s 
neighbors. 
Ownership also comes with the near-absolute right to 
exclude.  Property rights are in rem and thus exercised against 
the rest of the world.  With few exceptions, A has the right to 
exclude B, C, D, and E (and everyone else) from her property, 
and B, C, D, and E have duties not to enter A’s property 
uninvited or otherwise risk liability for trespass.  A is expected 
to reciprocate these duties and not enter B, C, D, or E’s property 
unless invited.  Similarly, A can exclude B, C, D, and E from his 
or her stock of food, and B, C, D, and E have a duty not to take 
A’s food or else risk being arrested for theft.  A, in turn, owes 
reciprocal duties with respect to everyone else’s food. 
These rules work well as long as A, B, C, D, and E have 
access to adequate shelter, food, and other life necessities.  These 
 
39. See G.A.I., Sic Utere Tuo ut Alienum Non Laedas, 5 MICH. L. REV. 673 
(1907). 
40. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 747.  Indeed, as an 
exception to property owners’ right to exclusion, the common law requires 
property owners to allow police on their premises to conduct an arrest or to 
prevent illegal activity.  Id. 
11
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rules, however, do not function as well when 46 million 
Americans are living at or below the federal poverty level, and 
20 million Americans are living in extreme poverty, meaning at 
or below half of the federal poverty level.41  Without resources to 
obtain adequate food and shelter, the poorest of our society end 
up owing duties to everyone else without receiving any 
meaningful reciprocal rights; this not only deprives the poor of 
the benefits of our property system, but also prohibits them from 
lawfully accessing resources necessary to their survival. 42 
Some may argue that this problem is taken care of by 
federal safety net programs, such as subsidized housing, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), all of which 
are financed by taxing property owners.43  These programs, 
however, fail to redistribute wealth adequately and fail to 
provide sufficient protections for the growing poor in our 
country.  State housing authorities simply do not have the 
funding to accommodate the ever-growing demand for public 
and subsidized housing.44  Individuals who qualify for these 
programs are left waiting on years-long wait lists and forced to 
try to find alternative housing on the open market.45  SNAP 
 
41. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 8, at 13. 
42. See Jeremy Waldron, Community and Property – For Those Who Have 
Neither, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 161, 178 (2009).  Some have argued that 
the law should develop a poverty defense in our law, similar to the defense of 
poverty in civil and criminal child neglect.  See Michele Estrin Gilman, The 
Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 495 (2013). 
43. SNAP is more commonly known as food stamps.  During the Clinton 
Administration, TANF was developed to replace the welfare program known 
as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Jobs 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, and the Emergency 
Assistance (EA) program. 
44. BRAVVE ET AL., supra note 33, at 2-4.  In the last fifteen years, the 
nation has lost 150,000 homes from the available affordable housing stock.  
Budget cuts continue to constrain the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development from providing additional affordable housing.  In 
fiscal year 2012, HUD’s budget was cut by 9%—$3.7 billion—compared to the 
previous year.  The Public Housing Capital Funding also suffers from funding 
problems, receiving 8% less in funding in fiscal year 2012, despite an estimate 
$25 billion in public housing capital needs.  The HOME program also suffered 
a budget cut of 38% in fiscal year 2012, which is likely to result in 31,000 fewer 
affordable rental homes. Id. 
45. Id. at 2-4.  For example, in Baltimore County, Maryland—a county 
with no public housing—the wait for a housing voucher is now ten years. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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benefits only provide support for food purchases and offers no 
assistance for other basic life necessities.46  Moreover, the TANF 
program only supplies short-term benefits and beneficiaries 
must comply with work requirements, which can be difficult for 
single parents.  Under federal law, an individual may receive 
TANF benefits for a total of five years; however, this time limit 
may be shortened by states. 
 
C. Property Scholars’ Response 
 
As debates over the growing disparity of wealth have 
intensified, property scholars have engaged in their own 
discussions over what should be the guiding principles of a 
property system.  Central to this debate is the right to exclude.47  
This part will briefly discuss the debate between information 
theorists and progressive property scholars. 
Information theorists, including Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith, have argued that property law should promote stable 
rules.  Property is a “device” to transmit information. Unlike 
contractual rights that can be negotiated and tailored to the 
parties’ specific interests, property rights are in rem, good 
against the rest of the world.  Therefore, a standardized set of 
rights should accompany ownership to serve as a “key shorthand 
method of delineating rights that saves on the transaction costs 
of delineating and processing information about rights in terms 
of uses and users.”48  These standardized rights allow non-
 
46. See STACY DEAN & DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, SNAP BENEFITS WILL BE CUT FOR NEARLY ALL PARTICIPANTS IN 
NOVEMBER 2013 (last revised Aug. 2, 2013, last updated Jan. 9, 2014), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3899.  While the 2009 
Recovery Act offered a boost to SNAP benefits, this support ended in November 
2013, causing nearly all SNAP recipients to lose hundreds of dollars in benefits 
per year. Id. 
47. See Rosser, supra note 17, at 109 (arguing progressive property 
scholars’ failure to adequately consider the right to acquire, including “the 
troubling origins of ownership in the United States” has constrained the 
progressive vision of property). Indeed, scholars’ focus on the right to exclude 
has been a source of criticism.  “Debates that center on exclusion and force 
progressives to defend relatively modest assertions, such as those that 
dominate property law today, limit progressive imagination and ambition.”  Id. 
48. Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 69, 79 (2005). 
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owners to efficiently comprehend what duties they owe other 
property owners.  Property thus serves as a “device for 
coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions over 
things.”49  Based on the numerus clausus principle, property is 
constrained to a limited number of immutable standardized 
forms.50  As part of this “standard package of legal rights” 
accompanying ownership, the right to exclude “is fundamental 
to the concept of property.”51 
On the other side, progressive property scholars—including 
Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, and Joseph Singer—
argue that the right to exclude need not be central to our 
property system.52  “The core of ownership is more complex than 
the right to exclude standing alone.”53  Property “implicates 
 
49. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2007). 
50. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 797 (2001). 
51. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 49, at 1849 (arguing that “the 
differentiating feature of a system of property—the right of the owner to act as 
the exclusive gatekeeper of the owned thing—must be regarded as a moral 
right”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 731 (1998) (“in demarcating the line between ‘property’ and 
‘nonproperty’—or ‘unowned things’ . . .—the right to exclude others is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property”); 
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702 
(2012) (“Because it makes sense in modern property systems to delegate to 
owners a choice from a range of uses and because protection allows for stability, 
appropriability, facilitation of planning and investment, liberty, and 
autonomy, we typically start with an exclusion strategy—and that goes not 
just for private property but for common and public property as well.”); see also 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  The 
Supreme Court has upheld the importance of exclusion: “[the] right to exclude 
[is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.’” Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176). 
52. See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009).  While Progressive Property scholars note 
that the right to exclude has been “extremely influential in the discussion of 
property rights,” it is “inadequate as the sole basis for resolving property 
conflicts or for designing property institutions.”  Id. 
53. Gregory S. Alexander, Reply, The Complex Core of Property, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2009).  In addition, Singer has recently argued 
that the right to exclude should be viewed as a standard, rather than a near-
absolute rule.  Relying on public accommodations and trespass laws, Singer 
argues that “[r]ecent changes in legal doctrine have in some cases defined the 
scope of the right to exclude through standards rather than rules.”  Joseph 
William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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plural and incommensurable values,”54 and has the potential—
and possibly a tradition—of promoting human flourishing.55 
Gregory Alexander argues that an underlying social-
obligation norm exists in American property law, though it has 
“never been explicitly recognized as such nor systematically 
developed.”56  This norm, Alexander argues, should be developed 
and strengthened because it enables “individuals to live lives 
worthy of human dignity.”57  Alexander relies on Aristotelian 
 
1369, 1391 (2013) (arguing standards can be more predictable than rules in 
property law). 
54. Alexander et al., supra note 52, at 743.  What these values precisely 
are depends on which theory you are discussing; progressive property scholars 
have yet to decide on a unified theory. 
55. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864 
(2009). While this Article will focus solely on Gregory Alexander’s social-
obligation norm theory of progressive property law, Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Joseph Singer and Jedediah Purdy have also set forth progressive visions of 
property law.  In Land Virtues, Peñalver argues that a property owner’s 
obligations arise from Aristotelian virtues that are “conducive to human 
flourishing.”  Id.  Land’s memory and our interconnectedness through land use 
require “balancing an interest in the aggregate welfare or wealth of society 
with a concern for the full spectrum of the other human goods that land-use 
decision implicate.”  Id. at 867-68.   Because Peñalver’s theory focuses on land 
use specifically and this Article discusses both real and personal property, 
Peñalver’s theory will not be the focus of this Article.  Under Singer’s 
democratic model of property, property is a “social and political institution” 
that serves the plural values of a free and democratic society, including 
autonomy, mobility, freedom, and equality.  Joseph Singer, Democratic Estates:  
Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1010, 
1054-55 (2009).  Because Singer’s property theory focuses on post-political 
property and this Article looks at the pre-political evolution of property rights, 
Singer’s theory is not central to this discussion.  In addition to these 
progressive property scholars, Jedediah Purdy argues that property law should 
aim to enhance functional freedom by opening up meaningful choices for 
individuals and promoting reciprocity over hierarchy.  Jedediah Purdy, A 
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New 
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1264-65 (2005). According to Purdy, property 
regimes should be viewed in terms of how well they promote functional 
freedom, by asking “how free people are . . . what are they able to do, which 
forms of human potential they have turned into actual capabilities that they 
can in fact exercise.”  Id. at 1244.  While Purdy’s scholarship closely aligns with 
the progressive vision of property, he has not formally associated with the 
progressive property movement. Jane Baron has set forth a wonderful 
summary of these theories.  See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of 
Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 927-32 (2010). 
56. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 745. 
57. Id.  
15
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virtue ethics58 and the capabilities approach developed by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum to argue that human 
flourishing allows individuals both the opportunity for a “well-
lived, and distinctly human life” and the capacity to make 
meaningful choices among alternative versions of this “well-
lived” life.59  Human flourishing is a “multivariable concept” 
with a diverse range of incommensurable inputs (or 
functionings) that humans have reason to value, including 
health, freedom, practical reasoning, and sociality.60 
Communities, according to Alexander, are imperative to 
human flourishing because they are the “mediating vehicles 
through which we come to acquire the resources we need to 
flourish and to become fully socialized,” and are vital to shaping 
our preferences and aspirations.61  Because our own flourishing 
is dependent upon the community, members of the community 
are obligated to support social structures that ensure all 
members of the community are allowed the capabilities to 
flourish.62  Under this theory, property rights of the wealthiest 
Americans may have to give way to ensure that all members of 
the community have the resources to live a life that they have 
reason to value and make meaningful choices to shape their 
lives.  The goals of property should focus on “cultivating the 
conditions necessary for members of our communities to live 
 
58. See id. at 760.  Under the Aristotelian view, though humans may 
strive for autonomy, we cannot escape our interdependent nature; “the human 
being is a social and political animal and is not self-sufficient alone.” Id. 
59. Id. at 762; see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 228 (Belknap 
Press 2009). 
60. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 751.  Sen argues that 
for complex, reasoning human’s there is no one homogenous good thing, such 
as the hedonist’s pleasure—we are capable of varying preferences and valuing 
ends differently.  “It is like seeking to make the life of the chef easier by finding 
something which—and which alone—we all like (such as smoked salmon, or 
perhaps french fries), or some one quality which we all must maximize (such 
as the saltiness of the food).”  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 77 
(1999). 
61. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 766. 
62. Id. at 770. Alexander’s arguments are not simply normative, but he 
also posits the positive argument that a social-obligation norm already exists— 
“albeit indirectly and confusingly” —in American property law.  To support this 
assertion, Alexander relies on a variety of cases from eminent domain to 
nuisance to public goods to environmental regulations to copyright and patent 
law.  See generally id. at 775-818. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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[valuable] lives and to promote just social relations, where 
justice means something more than simply aggregate wealth-
maximization.”63 
While progressive property scholars seek to shift our 
understanding of the purpose of our modern property system, 
inadequate attention has been given to how the foundation of 
our property regime emerged in the first place.  By 
understanding the foundational development of our modern-day 
property system, we can begin to understand whether, as the 
information theorists argue, we should be limited to the 
standardized forms of ownership currently enjoyed by property-
owners or, as progressive property scholars argue, we may 
successfully reimagine the structure of our property system and 
the purpose it plays in our modern society.  The next part 
explores theories on the pre-political formation of property and 
the attendant problems with these theories based on scientific 
evidence. 
 
III.   Problems with the Theories on the Origin of  
Property Rights 
 
While the right to exclude has been the “central fault line in 
property law and theory,”64 little attention has been paid to how 
property rights, including the right to exclude, originally 
developed.  Indeed, as James Krier has stated, the development 
“of property rights has been a topic in search of a theory.”65  The 
origin of property was a subject of inquiry for a number of 
seventeenth-century philosophers—including Hugo Grotius, 
Samuel von Pufendor, and John Locke—who believed that either 
social consent or government was necessary for the development 
of a stable property system.66  These theories, however, are 
contradicted by scientific evidence that indicates evolution is 
 
63. Id. at 819. 
64. Baron, supra note 55, at 919. 
65. Krier, supra note 9, at 139. 
66. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 378 (2003).  These theories of property were later 
incorporated into political and legal doctrine by William Blackstone, Thomas 
Rutherforth, Lord Mansfield, James Kent, and others, whose writings 
influenced early American property institutions.  Id. 
17
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potentially responsible for some of our most fundamental 
understanding of property rights. 
Under Grotius’ theory of the formation of property rights, in 
the beginning, private property did not exist, but instead all 
people had use-rights in resources: 
 
[T]he human race [possessed] a general right over 
things of a lower nature . . . each man could at 
once take whatever he wished for his own needs, 
and could consume whatever was capable of being 
consumed.  The enjoyment of this universal right 
then served the purpose of private ownership; for 
whatever each had thus taken for his own needs 
another could not take from him except by an 
unjust act.67 
 
Thus, a person could take what he or she needed, such as fish 
from a stream or apples from a tree, and no one could rightfully 
take that fish or apple away from the possessor; however, a 
person could not take full ownership of the stream or the tree.  
Once the person’s use of the object ended, so too did any rights 
in that object.68 
For private property to emerge, it was not enough for a 
person to merely take possession of an object, but there needed 
to be some kind of conscious social agreement: 
 
Property therefore must have been established 
either by express agreement, as by division, or by 
tacit consent, as by occupancy.  For as soon as it 
was found inconvenient to hold things in common, 
before any division of lands had been established, 
it is natural to suppose it must have been 
generally agreed, that whatever any one had 
occupied should be accounted his own.69 
 
67. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (“THE LAW OF WAR 
AND PEACE”) 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625). 
68. See Mossoff, supra note 66, at 380. 
69. GROTIUS, supra note 67, bk. 2, ch. 2; see also Mossoff, supra note 66, 
at 380. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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Thus, for Grotius, property emerged through conscious human 
design by either an implicit or explicit social agreement among 
members of a community that possession of an object or land led 
to a right to exclude all others from using it. 
Pufendorf followed Grotius’ general theory on the formation 
of private property.  For Pufendorf, in the beginning, all things 
were held in common and people had use-rights in the resources: 
“man had the right to apply to his own ends those things which 
were freely offered for the use of all.”70  For these use-rights to 
transform into property rights, there needed to be: 
 
an external act or seizure, for this to produce a 
moral effect, that is, an obligation on the part of 
others to refrain from a thing already seized by 
some one else, an antecedent pact was required 
and an express pact, indeed, when several men 
divided among themselves things open to all; but 
a tacit pact sufficed when the things occupied at 
that time had been left unpossessed by the first 
dividers of things.71 
 
Like Grotius, private property was a product of human 
design.  Property formed through possession of an object or 
occupancy of land and an agreement among members of a 
community that morally required all others to respect the 
possessor’s right to exclusively use that item. 
Locke broke away from Grotius’ and Pufendorf’s 
requirement for a social agreement.  Instead, Locke argued, 
private property is a natural right that was formed by man 
mixing his labor with a thing.72  Like Grotius and Pufendorf, 
 
70. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DEJURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 16 (n.p., 1688). 
71.  PUFENDORF, supra note 70, at 547. 
72. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, ¶¶ 31 –32, 45–
48 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008) (1690).  Not all seventeenth century theorists 
believed that property could exist without the establishment of government.  
Jeremy Bentham, for example, thought the two concepts were inextricably 
linked.  “Property and law are born together, and die together.  Before laws 
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”  
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (Richard Hildreth trans., 
1975) (1802).  As will be discussed in more detail below, this theory is 
19
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Locke began his theory of the formation of property in a pre-
political the state of nature where people held all land and 
natural resources in common.73  In the beginning “no body has 
originally a private Dominion, exclusive of the rest of 
Mankind.”74  Man could appropriate things as his own by mixing 
his labor with them:75 
 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is 
his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It 
being by him removed from the common state 
nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the 
common right of other men.76 
 
Under Locke’s theory, property could exist without the 
consent of others; however, without some sort of social compact, 
property claims became less secure as resources grew limited.  
For Locke, the right to exclude is the very definition of property.  
Locke worried that ownership in the state of nature could lead 
to a “State of War.”77  As populations grew, man’s ability to enjoy 
his rightful property became “very uncertain, and constantly 
exposed to the invasion of others.”  While individuals could make 
agreements to respect each other’s property, they could not 
prevent outsiders from swooping in and stealing possessions 
away.78  This is why man was willing to relinquish some of the 
 
inaccurate from an anthropological and biological perspective. 
73. LOCKE, supra note 72, ch. 5,  ¶¶ 25-26. 
74. Id. ¶ 26. 
75. Id.; See Mossoff, supra note 66, at 387. As Mossoff points out, Locke 
identifies the right in the state of nature “to the means necessary for self 
preservation as a claim-right,” meaning that it is an inclusive right to allow all 
the general use resources available on the earth.  Id.  Grotius and Pufendorf, 
on the other hand, identified a use-right in the state of nature, which focuses 
more on exclusivity.  Id. 
76. LOCKE, supra note 72, ch. 5, ¶ 27. 
77. Id. ¶ 17. 
78. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13, 81–84 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1960) (1651).  Thomas Hobbes, one of Locke’s 
contemporaries had similar concerns.  For Hobbes, in the state of nature, a 
person only needed to grab something out of the common stock of resources 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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freedoms he enjoyed in nature and enter into government to 
receive the protection government provided for his property.79 
Under each of these theories, stable property rights cannot 
exist without either community consent or government.  
Scientific evidence, however, demonstrates that individual 
claims on property date back to approximately eleven millennia 
ago, thousands of years before “forms of punishment and 
enforcement of property rights began to emerge.”80  In addition, 
there is evidence that property rights “emerged and proliferated 
without the assistance of states or other centralized enforcement 
agencies.”81 
Moreover, while Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke began their 
analysis in a theoretical state of nature, scientific evidence 
indicates that property claims do indeed exist in nature.  A wide 
range of animals, from sea urchins to mammals, display at least 
primitive conceptions of property, including the right to exclude 
and the right to exclusive use.82  These rights are the product of 
evolution, rather than conscious design or agreement. 
James Krier set forth an evolutionary theory on the 
formation of property rights.83  Under this theory, property 
 
and treat it as his or her own to transform the thing into private property.  
Hobbes worried that the state of nature would lead to a state of war, where life 
was filled with ongoing battles of possession. Id. 
79. LOCKE, supra note 72, ch. 5, ¶ 123-24 (“The great and chief end, 
therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
government, is the preservation of their property.  To which in the state of 
nature there are many things wanting.”). 
80. Krier, supra note 9, at 144 n.18 (quoting SAMUEL BOWLES, 
MICROECONOMICS:  BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND EVOLUTION 382 (2004)). 
81. Id. 
82. Hannah Kokko et al., From Hawks and Doves to Self-Consistent 
Games of Territorial Behavior, 167 AM. NATURALIST 901, 901 (2006). 
83. Krier, supra note 9, at 1. Krier begins his essay with a detailed account 
of economist Harold Demsetz’s theory on the formation of property rights.  Id.  
In his seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Demsetz argues 
that “the emergence of new property rights takes place in response to . . . new 
benefit-cost possibilities.”  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967).  In this article, Demsetz examined 
changes to property ownership in beaver hunting lands among Native 
American tribes living in Canada’s Labrador Peninsula with the growth of 
commercial trade with European settlers in the 1700s.  Id. at 351-53.   
According to Carol Rose, Demsetz took Locke’s and Hobbes’ story of the 
formation of property and “told it once again.”  Carol M. Rose, Evolution of 
Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
21
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rights first developed through evolution.  As will be discussed in 
more detail below, animals that evolved a strategy that respects 
ownership rights fare better than those that do not because they 
can concentrate on finding resources and reproducing rather 
than fighting over ownership; therefore, animals that follow this 
evolutionary decision rule are better represented in future 
generations.84  As humans evolved and developed the capacity 
for language and abstract thinking, they began living in groups 
and more complex property rules were developed through 
conscious human design.85 
While Krier’s essay is a great contribution to our 
understanding of the development of property rights, he stopped 
short of analyzing what specific contribution evolution has made 
to our modern understanding of property and what this means 
for our property system.  The remainder of this article will build 
on Professor Krier’s hypothesis by exploring the specific form of 
ownership displayed in animals, how these displays of 
ownership have influenced our common law understanding of 
ownership and property rights, and what this means for our 
modern day conception of property. 
 
LAW 94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  While Demsetz’s article has been the “point 
of departure for virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights,” it 
will not be the point of departure for this Article.  Thomas W. Merrill, 
Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 331, 331 (2002).  Despite the detail with which Demsetz reduces 
individual property rights to transaction costs, Demsetz failed to give an 
adequate account of how property rights form in the first place.  Krier, supra 
note 9, at 142.  Indeed, it is unclear in Demsetz’s article whether the hunting 
grounds started off as open access commons or limited access commons.  See 
id. at 144–45 (citing Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of 
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
129, 155 (1998)) (limited access commons is “commons on the inside, property 
on the outside”).  Therefore, Demsetz’s article is ambiguous as to whether the 
fur trader example is one of the emergence of private property rights (open 
access commons) or the transition from one form of private ownership to 
another (limited access commons).  The scope of this article is limited to the 
former. 
84. Krier, supra note 9, at 151.  Krier likened this to Hume’s theory of 
property arising as a convention, which he believed “arises gradually, and 
acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the 
inconveniences of transgressing it.”  Id. (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON 
HUMAN NATURE, bk. 3, pt 2, §2, at 490).  Typically, an evolutionary stable 
strategy, such as respect for ownership, does not arise out of conscious decision-
making, but rather this behavior is an inheritable trait.  Id. 
85. Id. at 158–59. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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IV. Property Ownership in Animals 
 
Animal behavior shares important evolutionary connections 
with human behavior.  Species are not essentialist, unchanging 
forms,86 but rather they have evolved over eons and continue to 
respond to evolutionary pressures today. 87 
Evolution has three basic building blocks: replication, 
mutation, and selection.  Evolution occurs on the genetic level; 
parents pass on genetic material—in the form of DNA—to their 
offspring.88  Genetic material not only controls animals’ variable 
physical features (size, coloring, shape of teeth, claws or horns), 
but also behavioral dispositions, leading to unconscious adaptive 
strategies or “decision rules” that “let animals behave in 
different ways in different circumstances” which can affect 
fitness:89 
 
[A]nimals can be considered choice machines . . . 
Those organisms predisposed (typically though 
 
86. Prior to the publication of Origins of Species, the essentialist theory 
was the leading explanation of diversity in the world.  While this theory is 
commonly known in Christianity as the intelligent design theory, this theory 
has roots dating back to Plato.  Plato believed in a metaphysical world of 
unchanging forms, separate and distinct from how objects and qualities 
appeared through the human sensations in the physical world. See generally 
Plato, Cratylus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE 
LETTERS 421 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. 
trans., 1961).  For example, while there were many different tables in the 
world, there was a singular form of table in the metaphysical world that held 
the essence of a table for its countless iterations in the physical world.  Id. at 
389.  “For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same 
instrument for the same purpose, make them all the same iron.  The form must 
be the same, but the material may vary . . . .”  Id. at 428. 
87. Prior to the Cambrian Explosion, for example, Earth was primarily 
composed of single-cellular organisms. ERNEST MAYR, WHAT EVOLUTION IS 209 
(2001).  During the Cambrian Explosion, which dates back to over 500 million 
years ago, environmental conditions on the Earth changed (including rising 
oxygen levels), leading to the emergence of a wide array of organisms.  Id.  The 
basic body structures for all animals alive today developed during this period.  
Id.  In fact, “no fundamentally new body plan has originated since the 500 
million years since the Cambrian” period.  Id.  It is from this common ancestry 
that both animals and humans have evolved.  Id. at 257. 
88. MARTIN A. NOWAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING THE 
EQUATIONS OF LIFE 9 (2006). 
89. CARL ZIMMER, EVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPH OF AN IDEA 333 (citing 
scientific work of Stephen Emlen). 
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not exclusively through natural selection) to those 
behaviors (from among all possible behaviors) 
that increased the probabilities of survival and 
eventual reproduction more than do alternative 
behaviors “chosen” by other members of the 
species left more offspring, many of which would 
share these behavior inclinations.  Such 
inclinations are frequently, of course, highly 
context specific and condition-dependent.  That is, 
evolutionary processes can equip an organism 
with “if-then” algorithms (often hierarchically 
ranked) such that: if encountering environmental 
condition A, increase the probability of behaving 
in way Y; but if encountering condition B, increase 
the probability of behaving in way Z.90 
 
During the reproductive and developmental processes, 
mutations can occur that cause new traits to emerge in offspring.  
These new traits can also affect an animal’s fitness, meaning the 
ability to survive and reproduce in a given environment.91  
Finally, because animals compete for all of life’s necessities, 
including food, shelter, and reproduction,92 natural selection 
determines what genes are better represented in future 
generations.  Animals that are more fit will have higher 
reproductive success and their genes will be better represented 
in future generations.93 
 
90. Owen D. Jones et al., Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law, 19 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 103, 107-08 (2011) [hereinafter Economics, Behavioral 
Biology, and Law]. 
91. MAYR, supra note 87, at 98.  While in a very simplistic sense, one may 
think fitness can be measured by counting an organisms offspring, fitness is 
really looking at the probability of (and to what extent) an organism’s genes 
being represented in future generations.  These genes can be carried by direct 
offspring and relatives.  “‘Inclusive fitness’ takes into account the varying 
probability—according to degrees of consanguinity—that copies of genes will 
appear in near relatives other than offspring, such as siblings, cousins, and 
nieces and nephews.  Thus, and counterintuitively, there are some 
circumstances in which an individual could increase her fitness by limiting her 
own reproductive efforts (and thus offspring) and using the saved resources to 
increase the reproduction of genetic relatives.”  Economics, Behavioral Biology, 
and Law, supra note 90, at 117. 
92. MAYR, supra note 87, at 124–25. 
93. Indeed, natural selection, rather than some divine creator, 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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Evolution is likely to be the reason why animals and 
humans share similar traits or behavior.94  Physiologically, most 
vertebrates have the same basic construction of their 
extremities; all vertebrates, except for fish, have two upper and 
two lower extremities, each having some form of five digits.95  In 
addition, evolution is responsible for certain genetically-
determined, competitively-advantageous behavioral traits 
shared between humans and animals.  A wide range of animals 
displays at least a primitive respect for possession.  This part 
explores how animals display ownership rights and why this 
behavior has evolved as a competitively advantageous solution.  
By understanding the specific components of these displays of 
ownership, we can better understand what role evolution has 
played in shaping our modern-day property system. 
 
A. Animal Contests 
 
While Jeremy Bentham famously claimed that “[p]roperty 
and law were born together, and would die together,”96 there is 
ample evidence in the scientific literature to suggest that 
animals in the wild display at least primitive forms of ownership 
and respect for property.  In order to understand how property 
rights evolved in animals, it is important to first understand how 
animals compete with one another for life-sustaining resources.  
As part of the competitive nature of survival, some animals fight.  
These fights often occur between conspecifics (animals of the 
same species) and can be costly in terms of time, energy, and 
health.  Competitors, however, will not engage in David-versus-
 
significantly contributes to the complexity of organisms.  Economics, 
Behavioral Biology, and Law, supra note 90, at 109.  “Extremely complex 
biological organisms exist not because they were designed by a creator 
attending to every detail but because wasteful characteristics are typically 
selected out of the countless random variations by the competition of 
resources.”  Id. 
94. Most animals, including humans, share similar “tool kit” of genes that 
controls how the body is built.  ZIMMER, supra note 89, at 137. 
95. MAYR, supra note 87, at 26. Indeed, in the very early stages of 
development, human embryos look remarkably similar to embryos of other 
mammals like dogs, cows, and mice but also even fish and reptiles in their early 
stages.  Id. at 29. 
96. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF PROPERTY:  IN THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 145-
47 (1914). 
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Goliath contests, where the fighting ability between the two 
competitors is so unequal that the stronger opponent is almost 
inevitably guaranteed to win.  In addition, animal fights are 
generally not a fight-to-the-death style of combat, but rather 
they are more like a settlement negotiation where both parties 
are trying to gain information to reach a resolution without 
incurring the costs of further litigation.  “The ultimate goal of a 
fight is that the winner may take sole possession of a resource, 
but since fighting entails costs such as time and energy 
expenditure and risk of injury, both opponents benefit from 
settling disputes as cheaply as possible.”97  Thus, many contests 
begin with posturing that allows competitors to size up their 
opponents. 
Behavioral scientists have long studied the factors that 
affect how animals behave in contests.98  Symmetrical contests 
are ones in which competitors are equally matched.  In this type 
of contest, escalated fighting often occurs, meaning the fight is 
likely to result in serious injury or even death.99  Asymmetrical 
contests are contests in which one contestant has a fighting 
advantage over the other.  Asymmetries can include a number 
of factors that potentially affect the outcome of a fight, for 
example, body size or shape of weapons (e.g. horns, beaks, or 
teeth).100  If an asymmetry directly affects an animal’s ability to 
fight, it is called a “correlated” asymmetry; if an asymmetry has 
no direct effect on the organism’s fighting ability, the asymmetry 
is referred to as a convention or “uncorrelated” asymmetry.  
When contests are asymmetrical, they are usually resolved prior 
to escalation, unless there is incomplete information or the 
 
97. Pilar Lopez et al., Fighting Rules and Rival Recognition Reduce Cost 
of Aggression in Male Lizards, Podarcis Hispanica, 49 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 111, 111 (2001) (citing JOHN ARCHER, THE BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY 
OF AGGRESSION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)); see also FELICITY A. 
HUNTINGFORD & ANGELA K. TURNER, ANIMAL CONFLICT (1987) (finding 
residency asymmetry had influence over the outcome of contests; however, this 
influence could be overcome by sufficient size differences). 
98. Erika B. Wiltenmuth, Agonistic and Sensory Behaviour of the 
Salamander Ensatina Eschscholtzii During Asymmetrical Contests, 52 ANIMAL 
BEHAV. 841, 841 (1996) (finding residency status had a stronger influence on 
the outcome of fights than size differences among competitors). 
99. John Maynard Smith & G. A. Parker, The Logic of Asymmetric 
Contests, 24 ANIMAL BEHAV. 159, 159–75 (1976). 
100. Id. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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payoff of winning exceeds the cost of injury.101 
Size is typically an asymmetry used to decide disputes 
between conspecifics.  A larger contestant has a fighting 
advantage due to his size on two levels.  First, larger animals 
may just be superior fighters; they “may possess greater 
incentive, vigour, agility, or energy reserves that can be used in 
aggressive acts.”102  Second, larger animals may fight less often 
than average-sized animals.  When two animals differ in size 
greatly, they are expected to avoid the costs fighting because the 
larger animal is so much more likely to win.103  Average-sized 
animals, on the other hand, are expected to get into more 
fights—and possibly more intense fights—because their size is 
comparable to many other competitor conspecifics in the 
population. 
 
B. Prior-Resident Effect 
 
Despite the competitive fighting advantage larger 
conspecifics may have, in many contests, the bigger fighter does 
not necessarily win.  Instead, fights are determined by which 
competitor is the prior possessor of the resource.104  John 
Maynard Smith and Geoffrey Parker were the first to propose 
that animals use the uncorrelated asymmetry of residency (or 
possession)—rather than some other asymmetry—as a 
convention to settle disputes.105 
 
101. Id.  When asymmetries are difficult to perceive, animal contests may 
be longer as the contestants attempt to gain more information about their 
competitor’s fighting ability.  See, e.g., Michael P. Haley, Resource-Holding 
Power Asymmetries, the Prior Residence Effect, and Reproductive Payoffs in 
Male Northern Elephant Seal Fights, 34 BEHAV. ECOLOGY SOCIOBIOLOGY 427-
34 (1994) (citing Magnus Enquist & Olof Leimar, Evolution of Fighting 
Behaviour: Decision Rules and Assessment of Relative Strength, 102 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 387–410 (1983); Peter Hammerstein & Geoffrey A. 
Parker, The Asymmetric War of Attrition, 96 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 647–82 
(1982); G.A. Parker & D.I. Rubenstein, Role Assessment, Reserve Strategy, and 
Acquisition of Information in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 
221 (1981)). 
102. Wiltenmuth, supra note 98, at 842. 
103. Id. Without taking residency into account, salamanders of similar 
size are expected to fight more frequently and with more intensity. Id. 
104. See, e.g., Darrell J. Kemp & Christer Wiklund, Residency Effects in 
Animal Contests, 271 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y. LONDON B 1707, 1707 (July 2004). 
105. See Smith & Parker, supra note 99; see also JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, 
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For example, for the male speckled wood butterfly, the best 
place to find females is in the spots of sunlight on the woodland 
floor.106  By night, male butterflies are safely tucked away within 
the treetops, but as the early morning light filters through the 
leaves, male butterflies begin occupying sunspots on the ground 
and following these spots throughout the day as they move with 
the trajectory of the sun.107 
Possession of the sunspot gives the possessor the right to 
exclude other male butterflies from entering the sunspot and the 
right to exclusive access to females that fly into the sunspot.  
When a female enters the sunspot, the male flies after her in an 
attempt to court her.108  When, however, another male enters the 
sunspot, he is seen as a potential intruder, and a contest for 
occupation of the sunspot ensues.  Both the resident male and 
potential intruder engage in a spiraling contest, in which both 
males fly close to each other, almost bumping into each other, 
and then they spiral vertically upwards towards the treetops.109  
The prior-resident almost always wins these contests and 
regains possession of his sunspot, even when the intruder 
appears to be bigger or have a competitive advantage.110 
 
EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). This residency advantage has 
been likened by some as a psychological competitive advantage that owners 
have over intruders.  See Kokko et al., supra note 82, at 901.  As Jeffrey Stake 
pointed out, an uncorrelated asymmetry can be just as evolutionarily 
advantageous as a correlated asymmetry: “[a]voiding a physical fight by 
deference to the first in time is just as effective in preserving genes as avoiding 
a fight by deference to the larger body.  An uncorrelated strategy can be 
evolutionarily stable even when there is a correlated strategy also available.” 
Jeffery Evans Stake, The Property “Instinct,” 359 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL. SOC’Y 
LONDON B 1763, 1764 (2004) [hereinafter The Property “Instinct”] (citing Peter 
Hammerstein, The Role of Asymmetries in Animal Contests, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 
193 (1981)). 
106. N.B. Davies, Territorial Defence in the Speckled Wood Butterfly 
(Parage Aegeria):  The Resident Always Wins, 26 ANIMAL BEHAV. 138, 138 
(1978) [hereinafter Territorial Defense in the Speckled Wood Butterfly]. 
107. Id. at 139. 
108. Id. at 140. 
109. Id. This rule only holds true when sunspots are sufficiently small.  It 
is beneficial for a male to obtain a large sunspot because the larger sunspot 
increases the number of females that fly by.  If a sunspot becomes too large, 
however, a male will not be able to detect and defend against all intruders.  
Therefore, male butterflies tend to share large sunspots that individuals are 
unable to defend by themselves.  Id. at 142. 
110. Id. at 145. The prior-resident effect is not limited to territory, but 
also can exist in other resources.  Male baboons, for example, can exert 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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This behavior is far from limited to butterflies.  Indeed, a 
vast array of animals—from insects to amphibians to 
mammals—determine the winner of contests with one simple 
rule: the owner always wins.111  Indeed, this is demonstrated in 
experiments where scientists reverse animal roles.  In contests 
for territory between dart-poison frogs, the prior-resident 
displayed much more aggressive behavior than the intruder and 
won in contests even when the intruder was significantly larger 
than the resident.112  When the prior-resident was placed in the 
role of the intruder (and vice versa), it no longer displayed such 
 
possessory rights over females through outward social behavior.  If male 
baboon A forms a bond with a female and this is observed by male baboon B, B 
will not try to court A’s female, even if B is bigger and stronger than A.  
Thankfully, females do have some say in the matter.  In laboratory settings, 
male baboons tend to respect social bonds if the female prefers her partner, 
which results in the female being more valuable to her partner (and possibly 
making the male partner more willing to fight for her) because she is likely to 
stay with him longer. Christian Bachman & Hans Kummer, Male Assessment 
of Female Choice in Hamadryas Baboons, 6 BEHAV. ECOLOGY SOCIOBIOLOGY 
315, 315–21 (1980). 
111. See Smith & Parker, supra note 99, at 172.  John Maynard Smith 
and G.A. Parker’s prior-resident hypothesis has been challenged by others.  
Some scientists argue that the residency is not an uncorrelated asymmetry, 
but rather prior-possessors win in disputes because they are superior 
competitors.  See, e.g., John Alcock, Body Size and Its Effect on Male-Male 
Competition in Hyolaeus Alcyoneus (Hymenoptera: Colletidae), J. INSECT 
BEHAV. 149, 155 (1995) (when resident bees are removed from their perches, 
they are taken over by smaller bees; when prior-residents are released, they 
quickly displace replacement bees); Darrell J. Kemp & Christer Wiklund, 
Residency Effects in Animal Contests, 271 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y. LONDON B 1707, 
1710 (2004) (when roles of resident and intruders were reversed, the previous 
resident (now intruder) won territorial disputes); Ann E. Pratt et al., The 
Assessment Game in Sand Fiddler Crab Contests for Breeding Burrows, 65 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 945 (2003) (resident crabs won fights over intruders because of 
larger claw size).  Others argue that residents win because they value the 
property more than their competitors.  See, e.g., John R. Krebs, Territorial 
Defence in the Great Tit (Paraus Major): Do Residents Always Win?, 11 BEHAV. 
ECOLOGY SOCIOBIOLOGY 185, 190–91 (1982) (when residents are removed and 
replaced, the longer the replacement is allowed on the territory, the more likely 
replacement will win in fight against intruder, indicating payoff asymmetry); 
S.A. Fayed et al., What Factors Contribute to an Ownership Advantage?, 4 
BIOLOGY LETTERS 143, 143–45 (2008) (finding owner’s knowledge of resources 
on territory and established relations with neighbors had small to medium 
effect on winning contests, but neither were statistically significant; 
statistically significant effect on fight outcomes to have access to burrows 
during fighting). 
112. Julia R. Baugh & Don C. Forester, Prior Residence Effect in the Dart-
Poison Frog, Dendrobates Pumilio, 131 BEHAV. 207, 214 (1994). 
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signs of aggression.113 
The prior-resident hypothesis is also demonstrated when 
confusion—usually accomplished through scientific 
manipulation—is created over ownership.  In the speckled wood 
butterfly experiments, escalated fights occurred when Davies 
was able to create confusion over ownership by placing an 
intruder butterfly in an occupied sunspot without the intruder 
or prior-resident noticing each other.114  In these cases when two 
conspecifics believe they are the rightful owner, an escalated 
spiraling competition occurred that lasted approximately ten 
times longer than the normal resident-intruder fights.115  
Similar results have been found in the damselflies, where 
residency asymmetries decided the winners of territorial 
disputes, except when there was confusion over the role of 
ownership, which led to escalated fighting.116  This escalated 
fighting can be explained through confusion over residency 
status, rather than some other asymmetry between the animals.  
Because both competitors believe they are the rightful owner, 
each believes the fight should be settled in his favor, which leads 
to the escalated fighting.117 
 
113. Id. 
114. Territorial Defence in the Speckled Wood Butterfly, supra note 106, 
at 145. 
115. Id. 
116. See Simon D. Gribbin & David J. Thompson, The Effects of Size and 
Residency on Territorial Disputes and Short-Term Mating Success in the 
Damselfly Pyrrhosoma Nymphula (Sulzer) (Zygoptera:  Coenagrionidae), 41 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 689, 689–95 (1991) (finding resident won 97.5% of contests, 
only losing when there was confusion over residency); Ian F. Harvey & Philip 
S. Corbet, Territorial Interactions Between Larvae of the Dragonfly 
Pyrrhosoma Nymphula: Outcome of Encounters, 34 ANIMAL BEHAV. 1550–61 
(1986) (finding in contests where prior resident lost, the resident acted more 
like an intruder, suggesting errors occur in role identification); Jonathan K. 
Waage, Confusion Over Residency and the Escalation of Damselfly Territorial 
Disputes, 36 ANIMAL BEHAV. 586–95 (1988) (finding escalated fights in 
damselflies was caused by “confusion over residency”).  Ownership role 
confusion has also been experimentally shown in the great tit bird, where 
escalated fights occurred 44% of the time when scientists created confusion 
over ownership between an owner and a replacement; however, escalated 
fighting only occurred 1% of the time between regular resident-intruder and 
resident-neighbor disputes.  Krebs, supra note 111, at 189. 
117. Gribbin & Thompson, supra note 116.  Confusion over ownership can 
have much more gruesome results.  Jordi Moya-Larano et al., Territoriality in 
a Cannibalistic Burrowing Wolf Spider, 83 ECOLOGY 856, 356–61 (2002) 
(residency status rather than size asymmetries determined whether the 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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Scientists believe the prior-resident effect is an evolutionary 
strategy because respect for ownership has survival benefits.  
Populations of species that respect ownership can dedicate more 
time and energy to finding resources and to mating successfully 
compared to populations that are continually fighting over 
ownership of resources. 
 
C. Game Theory Explanation of Prior-Resident Effect 
 
Game theorists have mathematically tested the prior-
resident effect hypothesis.118  In the most simplistic game, two 
conspecific animals compete over a resource that will give the 
winner an increase of fitness (equal to value v) compared to less 
favorable alternative resources.  With equal probability, each 
animal may be the first possessor or the intruder.  Each animal 
is genetically-predetermined to either display Hawk 
(aggressive) behavior or Dove (passive) behavior.  In aggressive 
contests between two Hawks, each animal has an equal chance 
of winning, and they fight until one is injured and retreats to the 
less favorable territory.  Injury comes at the cost of c, equating 
to the animals’ reduced fitness.  In passive contests between two 
Doves, each animal has an equal chance of winning.  While 
animals may engage in initial bluffing, neither animal will 
engage in a fight and the first to retreat is the loser.119  Under 
these rules, in mixed contests between one Hawk and one Dove, 
Hawks always win and receive the full value of the resource 
because Doves retreat before engaging in the fight.  The 
individual payoffs for animals engaging in these fights is as 
follows:120 
 
 H D 
H obtains value: ½ (v-c) v 
D obtains value: 0 v/2 
 
 
resident or intruder remained in territory).  When confusion over ownership 
arises in wolf spiders, if the two spiders were similar in size, fights often 
escalated, resulting in cannibalism one-third of the time.  Id. 
118. SMITH, supra note 105. 
119. Id. at 11-12. 
120. Id. at 12-15. 
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In a scenario where the value of the resource is greater than 
the potential cost of injury, or v>c, the aggressive Hawk behavior 
is competitively advantageous because Hawks always win 
against Doves and, in any Hawk-Hawk contest, the costs of 
injury are outweighed by the potential fitness gained by 
obtaining the disputed territory.  Therefore, in this scenario, 
Hawk behavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), 
meaning no alternative survival strategy will be able to 
outcompete the Hawk strategy.121  The Dove strategy is not an 
ESS because there is a greater payoff for animals having the 
genetically-determined Hawk strategy.122 
In a scenario where the value of the resource is outweighed 
by the potential costs of injury, or v<c, fighting is a competitively 
disadvantageous strategy, and a more-complex hybrid strategy 
may evolve.  One alternative, called the Bourgeois strategy, 
follows the prior-resident effect decision rule: “if owner, play 
Hawk; if intruder, play Dove.”123  If probability P that any 
individual is an owner remains ½, then the payoff matrix for the 
Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois is as follows:124 
 
 H D B 
H ½(v-c) v  ½(½ (v-c)) + ½(v)   
D 0 v/2 ½(0) + ½(v/2) 
B ½(½(v-c)) + (½(0))  ½(v) + ½(v/2) ½(v) + ½(0) 
 
In this scenario, the Bourgeois strategy is an ESS.  This can 
be shown most clearly by assigning values for the variables.  
Assume the value of the resource is equal to 2, v=2, and the cost 
of fighting is 4, c=4, and the probability that any one individual 
is an owner is 50%, p=½, then the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game 
has the following payoff matrix: 
 
 
 
 
 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 12-15. 
123. Id. at 22. 
124. Id. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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 H D B 
H -1 2 0.5 
D 0 1 0.5 
B -0.5 1.5 1.0 
 
In this example, Bourgeois is the only ESS.  Assuming all 
three strategies are equally dispersed among a population, the 
Bourgeois strategy nets a fitness gain of 2.0 against Hawks, 
Doves and other Bourgeois organisms(-0.5+1.5+1.0), while 
Hawks and Doves only net a 1.5 fitness gain (-1+2+0.5 and 
0+1+0.5, respectively).  This means that animals that exhibit the 
Bourgeois strategy will outcompete animals with either the 
aggressive Hawk strategy or the passive Dove strategy. 125  In 
this scenario, animals exhibiting the Bourgeois strategy will be 
successful and pass their genes on to subsequent generations, 
while animals exhibiting the other less favorable strategies will 
eventually be bred out of the community.126 
 
125. Some have suggested that the paradoxical strategy—owner always 
loses—is also an ESS.  This strategy has been observed in Goldeye fish. See, 
e.g., D.A. Fernet & R.J.F. Smith, Agonistic Behavior of Captive Goldeye 
(Hiodon Alosoides), 33 J. FISHERIES RES. BOARD CAN. 695, 701 (1976).  Indeed, 
there are very good reasons that intruders may be more desperate for 
resources; some animals need breeding territory to reproduce during the 
mating season, thus individuals may challenge these territories to at least gain 
temporary access to breeding grounds and the chance to reproduce 
successfully.  John Maynard Smith believed the paradoxical solution was an 
unsustainable strategy because it would lead to an infinite regression; animals 
would be so busy challenging each other for territory that they would have 
little to no time to procreate. SMITH, supra note 105, at 96.  While John 
Maynard Smith’s game theory analysis assumed a constant value for 
resources, under the paradoxical strategy, possession of resources is constantly 
being called into question, which reduces the overall value of the resource.  
When game theory analysis takes into account the environmental feedback of 
the paradoxical strategy, this strategy is only an ESS under extreme 
conditions, for instance when resident-breeder mortality is high, non-resident 
mortality is low, costs of fighting are high, and organisms are able to assess a 
large number of territories quickly.  See Kokko et al., supra note 82, at 904, 
909. 
126. SMITH, supra note 105, at 22-23; T. Wenseleers et al., Territorial 
Marking in the Desert Ant Cataglyphis Niger:  Does It Pay to Play Bourgeois? 
15 J. INSECT BEHAV. 85, 90 (2002).  As resources become low, and v>c, the 
Bourgeois strategy can breakdown in nature.  Desert ants mark territory by 
secreting hormones.  When resources are plentiful, animals act in accordance 
with the Bourgeois strategy, and ants defer to ownership of previous owner.  
When significant food stress was artificially placed on ants, the value of the 
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V. Nature’s Influence on the Common Law Conception of 
Ownership 
 
While the prior-resident effect may be an evolutionary 
stable and competitively advantageous strategy for animals in 
the wild, what does this animal behavior have to do with our 
modern-day property system?  This part analyzes how animal 
displays of ownership align with the common law conceptions of 
property that form the foundation of our property system to 
determine what aspects of our property system were influenced 
by evolution. 
Under the common law, “possession lies at the root of 
title.”127  According to rules of first possession, in order to gain 
ownership of an object or territory, the possessor must display a 
clear act of possession and others must understand this clear act 
as an act of possession.  Once these two conditions are satisfied, 
the possessor gains ownership rights, including the right to 
exclude others from using the object or entering the territory and 
the right to exclusive use of the object or the territory (including 
the resources on the land), until the property is abandoned.128  
Similarly, in order for ownership rights to emerge in the state of 
nature, animals must display clear acts of ownership that are 
recognized as such by other conspecifics.  Once animals have 
demonstrated possession of the resource, other competitors will 
not seriously challenge their right to exclude and right to 
exclusive use of the resource. 
The similarities between animal displays of ownership and 
our common law property rules indicate that evolution may have 
played a role in our common law conception of property.  The 
following subparts will analyze these similarities. 
 
resource increased and fights among ants escalated, some resulting in serious 
injury.  Id. 
127. Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 
1221, 1223 (1979); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258 
(“Occupancy is the taking of those things, which before belonged to nobody.  
This, as we have seen, is the true ground and foundation of all property, or of 
holding things in severalty, which by the law of nature, unqualified by that of 
society, were common to all mankind.”). 
128. The right to transfer also accompanies ownership right in the 
common law; however, they are not discussed here because they are not 
displayed by animals, and hence may not have an evolutionary foundation. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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A. Clear Act of Possession 
 
To gain ownership through possession, the common law 
typically requires a clear act of possession.  Pierson v. Post is a 
classic example of this requirement.129  This case involved 
hunting of a wild fox.  Post had been hunting the wild fox on a 
beach, and just when he was aiming for the kill, Pierson swooped 
in, killed the fox, and took off with it.  Post sued Pierson for the 
value of the dead fox.  In the state of nature, the fox belonged to 
no one.  To create a property interest in the fox, the court found 
possession, rather than pursuit, was necessary.130  The court 
reasoned that possession—by mortally wounding and taking the 
wild animal—created an ownership interest because mere 
pursuit did not foreclose the possibility of the fox escaping.131  By 
killing or mortally wounding the fox, however, the hunter 
communicates his “unequivocal intention of appropriating the 
animal to his individual use.”132 
 
129. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
130. Id. at 176 (“To create a title to an animal feroe naturor, occupancy is 
indispensable.”) (emphasis added).  The dissent thought the custom of 
sportsmen, rather than the opinion of jurists, should settle the dispute, arguing 
that the law should reward the huntsman labor and award ownership to Post 
who was in hot pursuit of the animal, rather than allowing a “saucy intruder” 
swoop in for the final kill and gain possession, as Pierson had done.  Id. at 181-
82 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“a pursuit like the present, through waste and 
unoccupied lands, and which must inevitably and speedily have terminated in 
corporeal possession, or bodily seisin, confers such a right to the object of it, as 
to make any one a wrong-doer, who shall interfere and shoulder the spoil”). See 
also Young v. Hitchens, 6 Q. B. 606 (1844) (merely encircling fish with net was 
insufficient to demonstrate possession). 
131. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 176-78. (“It is added also that this natural liberty 
[of the fox] may be regained even if in sight of the pursuer . . . it is laid down, 
that even wounding will not give a right of property in an animal that is 
unreclaimed.”). 
132. Id. at 178.  In Pierson, the actual possession rule was a simpler rule 
for the court to adopt, rather than the ownership by hot pursuit, which the 
Court feared would turn into endless bickering among hunters about what did 
and did not count as hot pursuit.  Once Pierson gained possession of the fox, 
he rightfully gained ownership rights in the fox, including to exclude the rest 
of world for using the fox without his permission and to do whatever he liked 
with the fox.  Note that the opposite also holds true; a lack of possession 
indicates a lack of ownership.  See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified 
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(holding the United States did not have claim on a sunken ship that was 
located on the continental shelf outside U.S. territories). 
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For both the common law and evolutionary respect for 
ownership strategy, possession requires “a single winner in a 
good number of situations; it can work only if it is based on some 
asymmetry.”133  For Pierson, the clear act of ownership (or 
asymmetry) was the act of mortally wounding the animal.  
Similarly, animals display clear signs of possession to signal 
ownership.  This clear act of ownership was described in Part IV, 
where the speckled wood butterfly physically occupied the 
sunspot throughout the day.  Once the butterfly left the sunspot, 
however, the sunspot was considered abandoned, and he was 
quickly replaced by another butterfly. 
In addition, animals display clear acts of ownership by 
aggressively defending their property.  As mentioned in Part IV, 
when a potential intruder approaches a resident dart-poison 
frog, the resident engages in significantly more aggressive 
behavior than the potential intruder, signaling that the prior-
resident is ready and willing to physically defend his territory if 
necessary.134  In resident-intruder conflicts in experimental 
settings, a majority of prior residents initiated fights with 
calling behavior, in which the prior-resident “orients toward his 
opponent, inflates his vocal pouch, and emits a staccato of harsh 
clicks.”135 
Chemical marking is another way that animals possess 
resources.  Ants, like many territorial animals, are able to 
differentiate ants from their colony and ants from other colonies 
through their pheromone markings.136  These chemicals are 
 
133. The Property “Instinct,” supra note 105, at 1765. 
134. Baugh & Forester, supra note 112, at 210-12.  This holds true even 
when the frogs’ roles are reversed.  Whatever frog is placed in the role of 
“resident” displays more aggressive behavior than the frog in the role of 
“intruder." Id.; see also Kate D. L. Umbers et al., The Effects of Residency and 
Body Size on Contest Initiation and Outcome in Territorial Dragon, 
Ctenophorus decresii,  PLOS ONE (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.00471
43 (finding tawny dragon displays aggressive behavior to signal possession of 
territorial claim; prior residents are more likely to initiate fights than 
intruders, and the animal that initiated the fight was more likely to win the 
ultimate contest). 
135. Baugh & Forester, supra note 112, at 210-12 (22 of the 30 bouts 
between resident and intruder began with calling behavior by the ultimate 
winner). 
136. Wenseleers et al., supra note 126, at 86 (finding resident status 
rather than size gave competitive advantage in resident-intruder contests). 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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deposited through feces and signal ants’ ownership of territory, 
and studies have found that ants that leave these territorial 
scent markers have a competitive advantage in resident-
intruder encounters.137 
Like the common law, animals are required to demonstrate 
a clear act of possession in order to obtain ownership rights. 
These clear acts of possession displayed in animals can include 
physical possession of the property, as the Court required in 
Pierson v. Post; agonistic behavior, similar to an owner guarding 
his property with a shotgun or placing a “Keep Out” sign on the 
property; or chemical cues, parallel to an owner fencing in the 
boundaries of his territory. 
 
B. Possession Providing Notice to Non-Owners 
 
A clear act of possession alone is not sufficient to obtain 
ownership through the common law.  You cannot yell in the 
middle of the forest that all the trees are yours and expect to 
have ownership over them.  “Possession must be observable,” 
meaning that act of possession must also provide notice of 
ownership to non-owners.138  A claim of ownership is a claim 
against the rest of the world; therefore, one can only expect 
ownership rights to be respected after notice is given to the 
inhabitants of that world in an understandable way.  Observable 
signals such as touching, grabbing, or mortally wounding prey 
have been used as clear signs of ownership in property law.139 
Brumagin v. Bradshaw demonstrates this requirement.  
This case involved a dispute over who was the first possessor of 
a tract of land just outside of San Francisco.  The plaintiff 
claimed that George Treat was the first possessor of the land and 
demonstrated his possession through repairing a fence across a 
portion of the land and pasturing livestock on the land.  The 
defendants argued that Treat’s “possession” was insufficient 
because he failed to enclose the entire land and outsiders could 
 
137. Id. at 90.  See also, e.g., Baugh & Forester, supra note 112, at 220 
(finding resident frogs marked moss on their territory with chemical cues 
through defecation and contact with their skin). 
138. The Property “Instinct,” supra note 105, at 1765. 
139. Id. 
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still access the land.140  Moreover, the land itself was not suitable 
for pasturing animals with the growth of San Francisco nearby.  
The court reasoned that, had Treat had fully enclosed the land 
by fence or ditch sufficient to keep cattle in, by the act of building 
of the enclosure “alone, and without other acts of dominion, he 
would have established an actual possession of the land.”141  
When an owner relies on natural boundaries, as George Treat 
had done, possession must correspond with the size and 
appropriate use of the land: 
 
The general principle pervading all this class of 
cases, where the inclosure consists wholly or 
partially of natural barriers, is, that the acts of 
dominion and ownership which establish a 
possessio pedis must correspond, in a reasonable 
degree, with the size of the tract, its condition and 
appropriate use, and must be such as usually 
accompany the ownership of land similarly 
situated.142 
 
Not only was Treat required to provide a clear act of ownership, 
but, to prevent unclear claims of ownership, he was also required 
to use the land in an appropriate way to give sufficient notice to 
the public that the land had been appropriated.143  As Carol Rose 
pointed out: 
 
If outsiders would think that a large area near a 
growing city was abandoned because it was 
vacant except for a few cows, they might enter on 
the land and claim some prime waterfront footage 
for themselves . . . Society is worst off in a world 
of vague claims; if no one knows whether he can 
 
140. Brumagim v.  Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24, 29–30 (1870).  According to the 
defendants’ arguments, the marsh, bay, and creeks abutting the land were 
insufficient enclosures.  Id.  In addition, there was a portion of land that was 
not enclosed at all.  Id. 
141. Id. at 46. 
142. Brumagim, 39 Cal. 24 at 50. 
143. Id. (ordering new trial; whether or not Treat possessed the land and 
provided sufficient notice of possession to the public through appropriate use 
was a question that the jury should have been allowed to decide). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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safely use the land, or from whom he should buy 
it if it is already claimed, the land may end up 
being used by too many people or by none at all.144 
 
Notice to the outside world also plays a key role in many 
adverse possession cases.  Adverse possession allows a 
trespasser on a property to become its rightful owner if he 
continuously occupies it for a significant period of time, such as 
twenty years.  This works as a statute of limitations for the 
titleholder of the property by requiring that the titleholder 
assert his or her rightful claim to the property and eject the 
trespasser within the adverse possession period.  If the 
titleholder fails to act in time, he or she will lose the title, and 
the trespasser will become the rightful owner of the property.  In 
order to gain title to the property, the trespasser’s possession 
must not only be actual, but also visible, open, notorious, and 
exclusive.145  Visible possession of the property is required to 
give the owners notice that someone else is claiming dominion 
over their land.146  In addition, the trespasser must be openly 
claiming someone else’s land as his, meaning that he must have 
knowledge that his claim affects the legal rights of another.  The 
possession must also be notorious, meaning “it is generally 
known and talked of by the public.”147  Finally, possession must 
be exclusive.  The trespasser must exclude the owner and other 
hopeful trespassers from the property in order to obtain title.148  
These requirements, when put together, require the adverse 
possessor not only to possess the property exclusively, but also 
to do so in such a way as to provide notice to both the owner and 
the community that he intends to gain rightful title to the land 
through adverse possession. 
Questions of whether a trespasser’s possession and use of 
the land give adequate notice to the owner and the community 
arise in many adverse possession cases.  Is cutting the grass 
 
144. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
73, 78 (1985). 
145. See, e.g., Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ind. 1937). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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sufficient notice?149  What about allowing your animals to graze 
on the land?150  How about paying taxes on the property?151  
Often, it is left to the jury—to the members of the community 
itself—to decide these questions.152 
For a clear act of possession to count, it must be clear to the 
rest of the world.  Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross involved two 
adjoining properties.  Marengo’s land contained an entrance to 
a cave that became a tourist destination, and people would pay 
for admission into the cave.  Unbeknownst to both parties (until 
a survey was completed), a portion of Marengo’s cave extended 
underneath the Ross’s adjacent property.153  Ross brought suit 
to eject Marengo from that portion of cave, and Marengo claimed 
that it had obtained title by exclusively possessing the cave for 
the past twenty-one years.154 
The court ruled in favor of Ross.  While there was no 
question that Marengo possessed the cave for the past twenty-
one years, Marengo’s subterranean possession of the cave failed 
to meet the requirements of adverse possession.  Marengo’s 
possession was not actual because the company never possessed 
the surface: “The title of the plaintiff extends from the surface to 
the center, but actual possession is confined to the surface.  Upon 
the surface he must be held to know all that the most careful 
observation by himself and his employees could reveal . . .”155  
Furthermore, Marengo’s possession was neither visible nor 
notorious.  This subterranean possession failed to give both the 
 
149. See Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 110 N.E. 772, 776 (N.Y. 1915) 
(cutting the grass could potentially be an improvement on the land to 
constitute adverse possession; question should be submitted to jury to decide); 
Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377 (1873) (entering disputed property once a year 
to remove a load or two of thatch does not constitute adverse possession). 
150. See, e.g., Osborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 267 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1954) 
(holding if adverse possessor claims grazing as his adverse use, then he must 
show that the disputed property was fenced); McShan v. Pitts, 554 S.W.2d 759, 
763-64 (Tex. App. 1977) (holding occasional grazing was insufficient to support 
a claim of adverse possession). 
151. See Slatin’s Props., Inc. v. Hassler, 291 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ill. 1972). 
152. See, e.g., Ramapo, 110 N.E. at 773 (ordering new trial; jury should 
have been able to decide whether cutting the grass was an adverse use to 
provide sufficient notice to the owner and the community of adverse claim). 
153. Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. 1937). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 921. 
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owner and the community at large notice that it had taken 
possession of a portion of Ross’s land.156  Finally, the possession 
was not open; Marengo did not even know it was trespassing on 
Ross’s property until a survey was completed.157  Thus, Marengo 
was a mere trespasser on Ross’s property.158 
Like the common law, animals must provide their 
community with notice of their property claims.  The prior-
residence effect hinges on other local conspecifics recognizing the 
possessor as the rightful inhabitant of the property and using 
this as a factor to settle disputes over territory.  Therefore, other 
animals must interpret a conspecific’s act of possession—
whether it be by physical occupation, aggressive behavior, or 
chemical marking—to mean that the individual is in possession 
of the resource and to signal to intruders that this is a reason 
not to seriously challenge the resident for the resource.  In order 
words, in order for animals to respect ownership, they must 
speak the same language.  The Bourgeois strategy only works if 
a potential intruder recognizes another as the possessor, which 
signals that the intruder should play dove and not attack. 
The importance of providing notice of possession to other 
conspecifics is emphasized when confusion over ownership 
arises.  As described in more detail in Part IV.A above, when 
confusion over ownership arises, such as through manipulation 
by scientists in experiments, an error in communication occurs 
where two conspecifics believe it is the rightful owner.159  When 
 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 919. 
158. The way a population interprets signals of ownership can be 
nuanced.  While touching or physical possession communicates possession in 
many circumstances, other times labor trumps physical touching for a signal 
of possession. See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506-07 (1871) (finding 
plaintiff who had shoveled manure into piles and left—rather than defendant 
who carted the manure away the next day—was the rightful owner of the 
manure, having provided sufficient notice to the rest of the world that he had 
claimed the manure as his personal property and was allotted a “reasonable 
time for the removal of this manure”).  This nuance is mirrored in animals.  
Unconscious decision rules in animals are “highly context-specific and 
condition-dependent.  That is, evolutionary processes can equip an organism 
with ‘if-then’ algorithms (often hierarchically ranked) such that:  if 
encountering environmental condition A, increase the probability of behaving 
in way Y; but if encountering condition B, increase the probability of behaving 
in way Z.”  Jones et al., supra note 90, at 108. 
159. See supra Part IV.A. 
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this error in communication arises, escalated fighting ensues, 
which leads both animals to expend large amounts of energy and 
places them at risk of injury or even death. 
Notice of possession to the local conspecific population is 
necessary for animals to respect the ownership rights of the prior 
resident.  This mirrors the requirement that possessors provide 
notice to the community (and the prior owner in the case of 
adverse possession) in order to gain rightful ownership of land 
under the common law.  For both the prior-residence effect and 
the common law, it is not sufficient that an individual possesses 
a resource, but that individual must also give notice of its 
possession to all those potentially affected by its property claim. 
 
C. Right to Exclude and Exclusive Use 
 
As discussed in Part II.C above, the right to exclude has 
been at the heart of many recent debates over property.  Not 
surprisingly, the right to exclude has been central to the Anglo-
American common law conception of property.  William 
Blackstone famously described property as the “sole and 
despotic dominion . . . exercise[d] over external things . . . in total 
exclusion of the right of any other.”160  The right to exclude has 
traditionally been protected under common law causes of action 
of ejectment and trespass.161  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the right to exclude as essential to property.162  In 
 
160. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; but see Carol M. Rose, 
Canons on Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998) 
(arguing that even Blackstone acknowledged the limitations of the right to 
exclude in the Commentaries).  Felix Cohen famously described the right to 
exclude to be an extension of property ownership:  “that is property to which 
the following label can be attached:  To the world: Keep off X unless you have 
my permission, which I may grant or withhold.  Signed:  Private citizen[.] 
Endorsed:  the state[.]” Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 
RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).  Of course, in the state of nature, there is no 
state to endorse these rights, but as this article has argued, evolutionary 
strategies (decision rules) control animals’ unconscious decision to respect 
ownership. 
161. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of 
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985) (“With respect to 
property in land the right to exclude depends to a large extent on whether the 
intrusion in question is subject to the common law of trespass or of nuisance.”). 
162. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (“the 
right to exclude others [is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court 
found that permanent physical occupation of real property—
however minor—constituted a taking, even if the occupation 
served a public purpose.163 
The right to exclude also exists in animal ownership (though 
in a slightly more tenuous form).  For animals that display the 
prior-resident effect, prior possession is treated as an 
asymmetry that can make conspecific competitors less likely to 
engage in a contest over that resource.  This deference to 
ownership arises even when the intruder is a larger and fiercer 
competitor than the prior resident.  Thus, a right to exclude 
emerges among animals.  Indeed, a prior possessor will 
vigorously defend its property claim if a competitor fails to follow 
the rules and attempts to intrude. 
In addition to the right to exclude, once an individual 
obtains possession of a territory and announces it to those 
potentially affected by this ownership, then, under the common 
law, he gains not only the right to exclusive use of the land, but 
also of the resources on the land, including underground 
resources such as oil and gas.  The right to resources, however, 
is limited to the resources physically located on the property at 
that point in time. 
For example, although landowners may undergo significant 
expenses in drilling for underground resources, the owner only 
has a right to the oil and gas beneath their land while they are 
physically on the land.  In concluding that the defendant had the 
right to use an oil pump, even though it adversely affected the 
amount of oil the plaintiff could draw from his well, one court 
stated: 
 
Plaintiff assumes that there is a certain fixed 
amount of oil and gas under his farm in which he 
has an absolute property.  True they belong to him 
while they are part of his land, but when they 
 
rights that are commonly characterized as property”’) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
163. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 
(1982) (holding New York statute allowing cable company to install cables on 
top of apartment building constituted a taking, entitling the owner to just 
compensation). 
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migrate to the lands of his neighbor or become 
under his control, they belong to the neighbor.164 
 
This rule holds true even when the neighboring owner uses 
superior inventions—such as a gas pump—to more effectively 
divert the resources into his own land.165  “Possession of the land, 
therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas [oil, or 
water].”166 
Like the common law, after an animal obtains possession 
and provides notice of that possession to the relevant 
community, the resident obtains exclusive access to the 
resources located on that property.  Under a game theory 
analysis, the resources on the territory represent the value of 
the territory and directly impact how hard a resident will fight 
to defend the property and an intruder will fight to gain control 
of the territory.  These resources can include necessities, such as 
food and shelter.167  For example, wagtails can be territorial and 
gain much of their food from their territories, spending 
approximately 90% of their time feeding on resources in their 
territory.168  Once these birds gain possession and provide notice 
of possession—through noisy and conspicuous calling behavior—
they have gained exclusive access to the resources on their 
 
164. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074, 1075 (Pa. 1900); see also 
Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) 
(likening oil and gas resources to wild animal, which all have the “power and 
tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.  They [the oil and gas] 
belong to the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as they are on or in 
it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into other land, 
or come under another’s control, the title of the former owner is gone.”). 
165. Jones, 44 A. at 1075 (“The plaintiff, if he has a right to use anything 
in nature, has a right to exercise that user by all the skill and invention of 
which a man is capable . . . .”). 
166. Id. (“If an adjoining or even distant owner drills his own land and 
taps your gas, so that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer 
yours, but his.”). 
167. See, e.g., N.B. Davies, Food, Flocking and Territorial Behaviour of 
the Pied Wagtail (Motacilla alba yarrellii Gould) in Winter, 45 J. ANIMAL 
ECOLOGY 235, 240 (1976) [hereinafter Food, Flocking and Territorial 
Behaviour] (finding territorial wagtails had exclusive access to food in their 
territory); Moya-Larano et al., supra note 117, at 357 (territory control in wolf 
spiders gives access to burrows in which they live). 
168. Food, Flocking and Territorial Behaviour, supra note 167, at 238. 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
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property.169 
Often times, residency status gives owners access to other 
wild animals, namely mating partners, on their property and 
this positively impacts their reproductive fitness.170  Similar to 
the court’s holding in Pierson v. Post, these possessors of 
territory only have a right to exclusive access to these other 
animals while they are physically in the owner’s territory.  Once 
an animal escapes and leaves the territory, the resident loses 
possession and exclusive access to the potential mate. 
For example, possession of a burrow greatly increases a 
male fiddler crab’s likelihood of mating success in a given 
season.171  Females select male partners based on the quality of 
his breeding burrow that will be used both for mating and for 
brooding fertilized eggs.172  Therefore, ownership of a burrow 
gives a male exclusive access to the burrow, allowing him to 
control how it is used.  In addition, if a male obtains possession 
of a burrow particularly one of a high quality—he is likely to 
enjoy a higher reproductive fitness than competitors who do not 
hold a burrow or hold an inferior burrow.173  Like the oil and gas 
 
169. Id. at 242-43.  Often the flocking wagtails had more access to food 
resources than those available on the territorial bird’s property.  Even when 
this happened, the territorial bird did not abandon its property, but simply left 
for a period of time to eat with the flocking birds, making sure to return to its 
territory for at least 10% of the day and display its territorial ownership of the 
property.  Id.  Interestingly, when neighboring wagtails trespassed onto 
another’s property, they did so silently and often when the owner was away.  
This type of behavior indicates that these intruders knew that they were 
entering another’s property.  Id. at 243. 
170. See, e.g., George F. Turner, The Fighting Tactics of Male 
Mouthbrooding Cichlids: The Effects of Size and Residency, 47 ANIMAL BEHAV. 
655, 656 (1992) (noting that male fish display territoriality when defending 
spawning pits during breeding season; the prior resident would retain or win 
disputes over ownership, except where intruder outweighed prior resident by 
significant amount). 
171. Pratt et al., supra note 111, at 946 (finding resident fiddler crab 
males won fights against intruders, however resident males were also 
generally competitively superior than intruders, with larger body size and 
claws). 
172. Id. 
173. Id.; see also Michael P. Haley, Resource-Holding Power Asymmetries, 
the Prior Residence Effect, and Reproductive Payoffs in Male Northern 
Elephant Seal Fights, 34 BEHAV. ECOLOGY SOCIOBIOLOGY 427, 428 (1994) 
(noting that male seal elephants enjoy the right to exclusive courtship of up to 
50 females as long as he maintains possession of them). 
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cases discussed above, a resident only has exclusive access to 
resources while they remain on his territory. 
Animal property claims share several key features with our 
common law property rules.  In order to gain ownership through 
possession, both animals and humans are required not only to 
demonstrate a clear act of ownership, but this clear act must also 
provide notice to the community that will be affected by the 
property claim.  In addition, once a property claim is established, 
ownership comes with the right to exclude and the right to 
exclusive use.  While humans have developed laws such as 
trespass and conversion in order to prevent outsiders from 
violating property owners’ rights, animals follow genetically 
determined behavioral rules that tell them not to seriously 
challenge ownership of resources already held by another 
conspecific. 
 
D. Arguments Against the Evolutionary Foundation of Property 
Rights 
 
In a 2011 essay, Ben Barros raised several arguments 
against the evolutionary foundation of our property system.  
First, Barros argues that scholarship has not provided “any 
actual evidence that respect for possession is an evolved trait.”174  
Second, Barros argues that evolution can only account for 
respect for current possession, whereas our modern-day property 
system protects rights of prior possessors.175  This part will 
address both of these concerns. 
Barros’ first argument presents a common, yet mistaken, 
understanding of how evolution works.  Barros argues “[t]he 
evolutionary lines of humans and any of these species diverged 
so long ago that it is preposterous to suggest that present 
behaviors are a shared heritage received from a common 
ancestor.”176  To support the hypothesis that there is an 
evolutionary foundation to our property rights, however, it need 
not be shown that respect for ownership evolved from some 
 
174. D. Benjamin Barros, The Biology of Possession, 20 WIDENER L.J. 291, 
305 (2011). 
175. Id. at 308. 
176. Id. at 307. 
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singular shared ancestor of butterflies, frogs, and humans.  Most 
animals, including humans, share similar “tool kits” of genes 
that control how the body is built.  These tool kits contain genes 
that mark off the front and back of the body, left and right, and 
head and tail.  They also contain genes that control the 
development of organs, such as the eyes and limbs. In some 
cases, these tool kits are so similar that you can donate a gene 
from one animal and have it function in an entirely different 
animal.  For example, you can donate the gene for making an 
eye in a mouse to a fly, and the mouse’s gene will function to help 
form the fly’s eye.177 
In addition, evolutionary traits can independently evolve 
multiple times and need not be traced back to a common 
ancestor. For example, the gene responsible for the development 
of the eye (Pax 6) exists in a wide range of organisms.  While a 
vast array of species share similar structures of the eye, this 
trait did not develop from a singular common ancestors.  Indeed, 
scientists have been able to pinpoint at least forty times this 
gene has been responsible for the eye independently evolving (in 
various stages of complexity).178  Therefore, shared evolutionary 
traits—whether it be the structure of the eye or respect for 
possession—need not be traced back to a singular common 
evolutionary ancestor in order for there to be an evolutionary 
basis for their development. 
Barros’ second argument—that evolution can only provide 
an argument for an evolutionary basis for current possessor’s 
rights, whereas our property law system protects rights of prior 
possessors—is also unpersuasive.  Barros argues that in order to 
show an evolutionary foundation for our property system, 
scientific students would have to show a scenario where “animal 
A possesses some territory and leaves for some reason; animal B 
arrives and possesses the territory; and animal A then returns, 
and animal B departs . . . .”179 
First, the difference between prior possession and current 
possession may not be as fundamental of a distinction as Barros 
argues.  As Stake has pointed out: “Caring about possession 
 
177. ZIMMER, supra note 89, at 137. 
178. See MAYR, supra note 87, at 205. 
179. Barros, supra note 174, at 308. 
47
  
2014 NATURE’S LAW 627 
means caring about current possession, but it also means caring 
about what was current possession in the past . . . . The law 
protects what was current possession at the time a wrong 
occurred.”180  Humans have a higher capacity for memory 
compared to animals and have created complex social and moral 
norms; therefore, humans have the capacity to develop laws to 
protect a current owner’s property rights from wrongs, such as 
stealing and trespassing: 
 
If the current possessor gained possession by a 
voluntary transfer from the previous possessor, 
the current possessor’s possession deserves the 
protection of society via the law. But if the current 
possessor gained possession by violating the norm 
of respect for possession, then the current 
possessor does not deserve society’s protection of 
possession. Protecting prior possession is often 
the only way for the law to protect the bourgeois 
norm of respect for possession.181 
 
Thus, current possession and prior possession may not be as 
distinct as Barros tries to argue.  Many animals may simply lack 
the capacity—whether it be due to lesser memory capacity, lack 
of norms, or inability to communicate prior possession—to 
respect prior possession in the way that Barros would find 
compelling.  It has been shown, however, when animals have the 
tools to communicate prior ownership that ownership can be 
respected precisely in the way Barros described above.  This gets 
us to the second and more important response to Barros’ 
argument. 
As discussed in Part V.A above, in order for respect for 
ownership to work there must be a clear act of possession that is 
communicated to surrounding non-owners.  For some animals, 
like the speckled wood butterfly, physical possession may be the 
only way they are capable of communicating ownership to other 
conspecifics.  Other animals have the capability of 
 
180. Jeffrey Stake, The Biology of Possession: A Brief Response to Barros   
(Maurer School of Law, Research Paper #177, 2010). 
181. Id. 
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communicating ownership through other means, such as their 
behavior or chemical marking, and have the potential to display 
behavior consistent with the scenario set forth by Barros.  
Territorial pied wagtails, for example, establish clear territory 
boundaries through displays of agonistic behavior directed 
toward neighboring conspecific territory owners.182  After 
territory boundaries are defined, a wagtail can leave its territory 
in search for food (animal A possesses some territory, and leaves 
for some reason).  While neighboring birds may sneak onto the 
property while the owner is away (animal B arrives and 
possesses the territory), once the prior owner returns, all 
conspecifics respect the territorial lines previous set (animal A 
then returns, and animal B departs).183  Therefore, when animals 
have the communication tools and memory capacity, the prior 
resident effect can protect interests of prior possession. 
 
VI. Implications for Property Law 
 
Given the similarities between animal displays of 
ownership and common law default rules, it is likely that our 
common law conception of property emerged through evolution.  
A broad range of animals developed to have an evolutionary 
strategy (or unconscious decision rule) that causes animals to 
respect ownership rights of prior possessors, including the right 
to exclude and exclusive use of resources.  This evolutionary 
solution may have evolved prior to the point where humans 
branched off from other animals or it may be a solution that 
independently evolved multiple times.  The similarities between 
the prior-resident effect displayed in animals and our common 
law property rules offer additional support that these rules are 
 
182. Food, Flocking and Territorial Behaviour, supra note 167, at 237. 
183. Id. at 242.  Both flocking and territorial wagtails typically spend 90% 
of their day eating; therefore, the territorial birds’ decision to spend at least 
10% of their time communicating their ownership rights, even when there was 
little food in the territory, demonstrates the importance of this communication, 
as it took away time and energy from their feeding.  Id.  “Even on days when 
little food was obtained in their territories, the owners kept returning for short 
periods throughout the day, often for 5-10 minutes only, before flying back to 
feed with the flock . . . . This must have been an important activity for the 
territorial birds since they only once spent less than 10% of the day on their 
territories even though the potential feeding conditions in the flock were 
always better than on their own territories.” Id. 
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remnants of our own species’ evolutionary history.  This part 
explores what this evolutionary origin could mean for our 
property system and how this may change the way we view the 
default rights that typically accompany ownership. 
While much of our common law conception of property may 
have evolutionary origins, this does not mean that this 
conception of property is necessarily the best for our modern 
society.  Evolution does not promise ideal solutions.  Despite the 
“survival of the fittest” adage, evolution is an imperfect 
process.184  The fact that a certain trait—such as deference to 
possessors—survived through the process of natural selection 
does not mean that it is necessarily the best solution for our 
current environment.185  It turns out that the standard for 
survival is not the best, but rather just a “good enough” 
solution.186  Evolution is not “inevitably an onward and upward 
process,” but evolutionary solutions survive because they were 
good enough for yesterday’s environment, not necessarily 
today’s.187 
 
[E]volution refers to a dynamic process observed 
when a characteristic or attribute increases or 
decreases the probabilities of reproduction or 
replication, and that trait is passed on with a 
greater or lesser probability through the 
production process.  When certain factors exist 
within a system, the trait or characteristic will be 
selected and greater proportion of the agents 
within that system will take on that characteristic 
until that population reaches some ceiling based 
 
184. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spencer/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). Contrary 
to popular misconception, the phrase “survival of the fittest” came from 
Herbert Spencer, not Charles Darwin. Id. 
185. E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS 
L. J. 595, 599 (1997). 
186. Id.  Herbert Simon calls this idea of evolutionary solutions being good 
enough:  “satisficing.” Id. 
187. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1996) (arguing law and economics model should be 
modified to account for modern understandings of biological evolution, chaos 
theory and path dependence). 
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on the external environment.188 
 
The evolutionary process has been analogized to an 
individual standing on one of many hills in the pitch black of 
midnight.  The individual’s goal is to get to the top of the hill, 
and she can only feel which direction she is going by the angle of 
her feet.  Natural selection prevents the individual from 
descending down the hill.  When her feet level off, she can tell 
she has reached the top of this hill, but she has no way of 
knowing whether she is on a foothill or the tallest mountain.  
Without more information—without turning on the lights—the 
individual cannot justify pursuing another strategy because 
there is no way to compare the current strategy with an 
alternative strategy.189 
By making the right to exclude central to our understanding 
of property, we may be clinging to a strategy that, while 
satisfactory when it emerged, is not necessarily ideal for our 
modern society.  While in most environments the deference to 
prior possessor strategy is more favorable than a no respect 
strategy, these are not the only options.  The deference to 
possessor strategy likely emerged ages ago.  This strategy 
evolved prior to the rise in technology, prior to the formation of 
cities, and prior even to the evolution of human intelligence.190  
The environment and human societal needs have massively 
changed since the evolution of that decision rule, so it cannot be 
assumed that this strategy is the best option for our modern 
society.  Because humans are capable of engaging in critical 
thinking, we need not rely on rules based on unconscious 
evolutionary strategies as the underpinnings of our property 
system.191 
 
188. Daniel M. Katz et al., Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and 
the Evolution of the Law:  Toward a Positive Theory of Judicial Social 
Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 982 (2008) (applying complex adaptive 
system modeling to judicial decision-making). 
189. Id.; Roe, supra note 187, at 642-43; NOWAK, supra note 88. 
190. It is estimated that humans began developing the capacity for 
language and critical thinking approximately 100,000 years ago. See Johnthan 
Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 312 SCI. 998 (2007); Krier, 
supra note 9, at 157 (citing EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW 
SYNTHESIS 564-69 (2000)). 
191. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral 
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Furthermore, evolution does not provide moral solutions.  
The fact that the right to exclude and the right to exclusive use 
are likely products of our evolutionary history does not mean we 
can make any normative assessment about these aspects of our 
conception of property.  To make the jump from an evolutionary 
factual outcome to a normative judgment would be a naturalistic 
fallacy.192  The lone existence of scientific facts cannot tell us 
anything about our normative judgments.  Scientific facts 
cannot show us what ought-to-be anymore than what “ought-to-
be” can create scientific facts.193  To put it succinctly: property is 
“natural and not Natural law.”194 
While we cannot ascribe normative assessments to 
evolutionary outcomes, we also cannot divorce ourselves from 
evolution either.  In some ways, our evolutionary history is 
neurologically hardwired within us.  The brain, like the rest of 
us, is a product of evolution and subject to the same 
imperfections that come along with the evolutionary process.  
Research shows that when a monkey reaches for an item, a 
certain group of neurons fire.  When that monkey views a human 
or other monkey grasp an object, the same group of neurons fire.  
Therefore, our brains may have evolved to become hardwired 
that when an object is in our possession and there is no previous 
owner to recognize, we perceive at least a simplistic sense of 
ownership. 
 
We may be programmed to recognize when we 
have a certain proximate relationship to a 
physical object and, by mirroring, to recognize 
when others have a similar relationship to an 
object . . . . Certain combinations of information – 
“it is in my grasp” plus “there is no previous 
owner” – may throw a biological switch making us 
more willing to be assertive in preventing others 
 
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 435 (2005) (“(1) evolutionary processes tend 
to predispose organisms to behave in ways that increased reproductive success, 
on average in ancestral environments, and (2) the effects of that predisposition 
can be, and often are, wholly independent of consciously perceived ‘motives’ for 
behaviors.”). 
192. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 191, at 485. 
193. Id. 
194. A.G. Keller, Law in Evolution, 28 YALE L.J. 769, 783 (1919). 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/3
  
632 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
from taking the thing.195 
 
This is not to say that human beings are the same as 
animals; however, with our common evolutionary origin, we may 
be hardwired similarly.  Humans, however, are set apart even 
from our closest ancestors in our problem-solving capabilities.  
Our “large brains and well-developed capacities for culture and 
language cause us to use adaptive strategies that can often be 
seen only in simple, more rudimentary parallels among other 
primates.”196 
In our modern world, societal forces play a large role in 
shaping our property laws.  These societal forces can include 
cultural, social, and political forces.  Both evolutionary and 
societal forces co-exist and create feedback systems: 
 
[C]ulture and cultural change are the products of 
minds, but minds are themselves biological 
entities that have both developmental and 
evolutionary histories . . . minds therefore create 
cultural features that reflect this evolutionary 
heritage [and] . . . cultural change can also feed 
back on biological evolution.197 
 
Societal change can lead to biological change and vice versa.  For 
example, the evolutionary expansion of the cortical motor 
system in species prepares them to be able to develop and use 
tools to better adapt to their environment.198  Then, for species, 
 
195. Jeffery Evans Stake, Pushing Evolutionary Analysis of Law, 53 FLA. 
L. REV. 875, 887 (2001) (citing Giacomo Rizzalatti et al., Premotor Cortex and 
the Recognition of Motor Actions, 3 COGNITIVE BRAIN RES. 131, 134-36 (1996)).  
Indeed, this may be why physical touching is so central to our idea of 
possession and ownership in both animal behavior and the common law. The 
Property “Instinct,” supra note 105, at 1765. 
196. E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons:  Evolutionary 
Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17, 20 (2001) 
(arguing evolutionary biology, rather than economics, provides a better lens for 
understanding environmental law). 
197. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 191, at 481. 
198. See PHILIP LIEBERMAN, HUMAN LANGUAGE AND OUR REPTILIAN BRAIN: 
THE SUBCORTICAL BASES OF SPEECH, SYNTAX, AND THOUGHT 36-62 (2d ed. 2002); 
Vittorio Gallese et al., Action Recognition in the Premotor Cortex, 119 Brain 
593-609 (1996); Alex Martin, The Representation of Object Concepts in the 
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including humans, that have used this biological advancement 
to develop tools to better adapt to environmental conditions, 
scientists have observed the biological development of neural 
regions that participate in tool making, use, and recognition.199  
The ability to develop and recognize tools then changes how 
individuals interact culturally.  The feedback system created 
through cultural and evolutionary forces has positively 
contributed to the development of humans.  “[H]uman beings 
have evolved biologically in the way that they have over the last 
ten thousand years in part because of the development of 
culture, learning and other tools.”200 
Societal forces can and should influence and change our 
property laws.  Because no normative assessment can be placed 
on property default rules that have emerged through evolution, 
it is only through societal forces that we can place any moral 
value on our property rules.  Indeed, the absolute nature of 
property rights, rooted in more primitive forms of ownership 
displayed in the animal kingdom, at times, must give way to 
societal pressures: 
 
[A]n owner must expect to find the absoluteness 
of his property rights curtailed by the organs of 
society, for the promotion of the best interests of 
others for whom these organs also operate as 
protective agencies. The necessity for such 
curtailments is greater in a modern industrialized 
and urbanized society than it was in the relatively 
simple American society of fifty, 100, or 200 years 
ago. The current balance between individualism 
and dominance of the social interest depends not 
only upon political and social ideologies, but also 
upon the physical and social facts of the time and 
 
Brain, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 25-45 (2007); Michael T. Ullman, Contributions 
of Memory Circuits to Languages: The Declarative/ Procedural Model, 92 
COGNITION 231 (2004). 
199. See TOOLS, LANGUAGE AND COGNITION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION  
(Kathleen R. Gibson and Tim Ingold, eds.1993); Scott H. Johnson-Frey, The 
Neural Bases of Complex Tool Use in Humans, 8 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 71 
(2004); Martin, supra note 198. 
200. Elliott, supra note 185, at 607. 
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place under discussion.201 
 
While our property system routinely upholds the evolutionary 
strategy, protecting the near-absolute right to exclude and right 
to exclusive use, these rights can give way—and, indeed, have in 
some cases given way—to societal demands.  A number of cases 
cited by Gregory Alexander in The Social-Obligation Norm 
demonstrate this.  While Alexander argues that these examples 
help demonstrate an underlying and under-theorized norm in 
American property law,202 these examples may also be 
understood as a piecemeal departure from the evolutionary 
strategy. 
In the Social-Obligation Norm, Alexander uses historic 
preservation regulations as an example of rules restricting 
owner’s right to exclusive use of their property and argues that 
this is an example of the underlying social-obligation norm in 
American property law.  Historic preservation laws limit an 
owner’s ability to transform the appearance of his or her 
property to ensure the property retains its historic character.  
For example, in State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, the court 
upheld one of these historic preservation laws, upholding a city’s 
decision to deny a building permit to a property owner who 
wanted to build a “highly modernistic” home in a neighborhood 
filled with traditional homes.203  Alexander argues these types of 
cases highlight our interdependence and homeowners’ 
obligations to each other and the community to preserve the 
historic character of a neighborhood.204  Surely, Alexander is 
 
201. 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 745 (1970). 
202. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 774 (“The point is not 
that current American property law, public and private, has already 
internalized the idea that property owners owe thick responsibilities to the 
communities to which they belong.  It has not.  But American property law has 
partially internalized social obligations, albeit indirectly and confusingly.”). 
203. State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo. 1970).  
The realtors argued that characterizing the “proposed residence as ‘unusual in 
design’ is the understatement of the year.  It is in fact a monstrosity of 
grotesque design, which would seriously impair the value of property in the 
neighborhood.”  Id. 
204. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 791-92 (“Given the 
unique character of the neighborhood property owners in historic districts are 
in relationships of interdependency that confer on each of them particular 
obligations that urban landowners otherwise do not have.”). 
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right in that zoning regulations develop almost necessarily 
through a sense of interdependence.  There is no need for such 
regulation if man lives in isolation and what he does with his 
property has no impact on others.  The impetus for the 
proliferation of property-use regulations, including historic 
preservation regulations, however, may better be explained by 
changing social pressures, rather than an underlying social 
obligation tradition in American property law. 
Zoning regulations emerged in the late-nineteenth century 
in response to increasing industrialization and urbanization.205  
People were steadily moving into cities, and by the turn of the 
century, 40% of the population lived in cities.206  While early 
zoning cases show a court’s willingness to abide by space 
requirements, such as frontage area, courts seemed hesitant to 
allow regulations to dictate the aesthetics of the structure.207  In 
Byrne v. Maryland Realty Company, the court overturned an 
ordinance requiring that all structures being built in a certain 
area of Baltimore be free-standing, made of brick or stone, and 
stand twenty-five feet apart from other buildings.208  Defendant 
sought to construct brick duplexes.  While the appellant argued 
the proposed structures were a “cheap, two-story development of 
congested dwellings” and would be “very detrimental and 
undesirable,”209 the court found that these structures did not 
threaten public health and “to prohibit their construction upon 
this ground would be carrying the police power to an extent that 
 
205. Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the 
City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 957 (2013). 
206. Id. 
207. See, e.g., Wood v. Bldg. Comm’r, 152 N.E. 63, 64 (Mass. 1926) 
(ordering revocation of permit for owner to build home that violated yard space 
requirements); Norcross v. Bd. of Appeal, 150 N.E. 887, 890 (Mass. 1926) 
(upholding board’s denial of variance to exceed building height limitations; 
power to grant variations should be “sparingly exercised” in “rare instances 
and under exceptional circumstances”).  Indeed, some courts were unwilling to 
uphold even frontage or yard-space zoning requirements.  See, e.g., Hedgcock 
v. People, 13 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. 1932) (denial of building permit because 
building failed to comply with frontage requirement was arbitrary and 
capricious use of police power that did not benefit public welfare); State ex rel 
Rudensey v. Senior, 133 A. 777 (N.J. Sup. 1926) (ordinance requiring 25 foot 
setback held invalid). 
208. Byrne v. Md. Realty Co., 98 A. 547, 547 (Md. 1916). 
209. Id. at 548. 
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would alarm the public.”210  The Court found the ordinance to go 
beyond the police power and to be unconstitutional. 
Society began to change rapidly and dramatically with the 
onset of the industrial revolution.  The United States switched 
from having a primarily agrarian society to a predominantly 
urban one.  These changes were unprecedented in human 
history and occurred at a pace much more rapid than evolution.  
During the twentieth-century, people continued to move into 
cities, increasing the effect of one property owner’s decision on 
the rest of the community.  By the 1960s almost 70% of the 
population lived in cities, 80% in the Northeast.  Thus, with the 
changing societal and environmental pressures, courts began 
upholding aesthetic regulations, preventing property owners 
from constructing buildings that severely departed from the 
character of the neighborhood.211 
By the end of the twentieth-century, as urbanization 
continued (80% of the population was now living in cities), 
aesthetic regulations became even more exacting.212  No longer 
were they only prohibiting the bizarre modernistic house 
planned in a traditional neighborhood, but more and more courts 
began to regulate the details of proposed structures, controlling 
 
210. Id. at 549. 
211. See, e.g., Marr v. Back Bay Architectural Comm’n, 505 N.E.2d 534 
(Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding denial of building permit to build garage and 
driveway that did not conform to aesthetic character of neighborhood); Reid v. 
Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ohio App. 1963) (upholding 
denial of permit to construct single-story u-shaped structure in multi-story 
residential suburban neighborhood; “ordinance designed to protect values and 
to maintain a high character of community development is in the public 
interest and contributes to the general welfare”). 
212. While it is unconstitutional to regulate property-use based on 
aesthetics alone, when a proposed property strays from the aesthetic character 
of the neighborhood, a property owner can be restricted from building such a 
structure based on concerns of public interest and general welfare. 
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for size,213 skylights,214 and building material.215  Urbanization, 
rather than a social-obligation norm, may better explain why the 
law has imposed increasing exception on property owner’s right 
to use their property.  As more and more people live in more 
densely populated neighborhoods, one property owner has the 
ability to negatively impact a large number of surrounding 
homeowners.  Societal pressures of urbanization have caused 
the right to exclusive use to weaken and allow the government 
in some situations to prevent a property owner from doing 
something with his property that will be detrimental to the 
public interest or general welfare of the neighborhood. 
Similarly, Alexander’s arguments for a social-obligation 
norm underlying environmental regulations can also be 
explained through changes in societal pressures.216  Alexander 
uses wetland regulations as an example: 
 
The contribution of wetlands to maintaining the 
well-being of fragile and complex ecosystems is 
enormous.  Wetlands perform a remarkable 
 
213. See, e.g., Breneric Assocs. v. City of Del Mar, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 
332-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding board’s denial of permit for homeowner 
to build two-story addition; where most buildings in neighborhood were one-
story and proposed glass paneled roof deck did not conform with architectural 
character of the city); Ryan v. Adirondack Park Agency, 589 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 
(App. Div. 1992) (upholding denial of permit to allow petitioner to build three-
story building with 5,000 square feet of living when petitioners original permit 
only allowed a 1,500 square foot single-story building, where building would 
be highly visible from Lake George); Guinnane v. S.F. City Planning Comm’n, 
257 Cal. Rptr. 742, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding city’s exercise of 
discretion to deny permit for plaintiff to build a 6,000 square foot house that 
would “have an adverse visual effect in that the large size of the proposed 
dwelling was incompatible with the character of the neighborhood”). 
214. In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 580 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Vt. 1990) 
(upholding Environmental Board requiring condominium owner to remove 
skylights and larger sliding glass door that was built prior to obtaining 
permits, where such changes had an adverse aesthetic impact). 
215. Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning 
Comm’n, 590 A.2d 1080, 1090-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (upholding 
planning board requiring certain material—wood, brick, stucco, or stone, 
rather than siding—to be used on exterior of development to improve the 
quality of housing and preserve area). 
216. See Rosser, supra note 17, at 117 (arguing that Shack, Matthews, and 
Raleigh are mere exceptions to a long line of cases upholding property owners’ 
strong right to exclude). 
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variety of valuable functions, ranging from 
filtering storing waters to providing fish and 
wildlife habitats.  At the same time, prior to the 
1970s, wetlands were disappearing at an 
alarming rate, as population increase and urban 
development created greater pressure to fill in 
wetlands, making their available to commercial 
and residential development.  Since then, 
wetlands have been widely regulated at both 
federal and state levels.217 
 
The propagation of environmental protections for wetlands 
can just as easily be explained by changing social conditions.  In 
the 1970s, not only were cities filling up with people, threatening 
to develop over wetlands, but also there was an increased social 
awareness about the environment.  March 21, 1970, marked the 
inauguration of Earth Day.  And the wetlands were something 
to care about; they are ecologically important and dwindling.  
Thus, this is possibly another example of the court allowing the 
law to change to better-fit modern societal needs. 
Alexander also cites cases in which owners’ right to exclude 
is curtailed.  In State v. Shack, for example, migrant farm 
workers were housed a camp located on their employer’s 
property.218  Medical and legal service providers were charged 
with trespass when they entered onto the employer’s land to 
remove 28 sutures from one worker and provide legal advice to 
two workers.219 
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trespass 
convictions could not stand because “the ownership of real 
property does not include the right [to] bar access to government 
services available to migrant workers . . . .”220  The employer’s 
property rights must give way to societal needs. 
 
Property rights serve human values.  They are 
recognized to that end and are limited by it.  Title 
 
217. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 796. 
218. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. 1971). 
219. Id. at 370. 
220. Id. at 371-72. 
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to real property cannot include dominion over the 
destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon 
the premises.  Their well-being must remain the 
paramount concern of a system of law.221 
 
While this excerpt comes close to acknowledging explicitly that 
property law places social obligations on owners, societal 
pressures can also explain this decision. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, more and more migrant farmworker 
accepted seasonal jobs.  “We are told that every year 
farmworkers and their families numbering more than one 
million leave their home areas to fill the seasonal demand for 
farm labor in the United States.”222  Indeed, Congress passed the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to try to help with this 
growing population’s immediate needs of childcare, education, 
and health and legal services, as well as their long-term needs 
of developing work skills to become self-sustaining members of 
the community. 223  While, in Shack, the court declined to extend 
all rights that come with tenancy, the court held the employer’s 
right to exclude could not extend to deny workers the 
opportunity to receive aid from governmental or charitable 
organizations or from receiving their own visitors.224  Although 
the Court unquestionably limited the right to exclude and 
explicitly stated that “property rights serve human values,” the 
court limited its holding to the scope of federal law and refused 
to extend full tenancy rights to these workers.  In this case, the 
court carved out a limited exception to the right to exclude in 
response to societal changes, including changes in federal law. 
Similarly, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement 
Association and Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis 
Beach Club, Inc., the court limited private property owner’s right 
of exclusion based on changing societal demands.  In these cases, 
the court expanded the public trust doctrine to allow the public 
onto privately-owned dry sand beaches for recreational 
purposes.225  The public trust doctrine originally protected the 
 
221. Id. at 372. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.). 
224. Id. at 374. 
225. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 
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public’s access to the wet beach area extending from the high 
and low water marks of the tide for the primary purpose of 
allowing people access to fishing.226  The doctrine was extended 
to include a public’s right to engage in recreational activities, 
such as bathing and swimming, on municipally-owned beaches 
in the 1970s with the increase in urbanization.227 
Again, the societal pressure of urbanization may have been 
responsible for this decision.  Society had changed significantly 
since the public trust doctrine was established.  A rise in 
industry brought more people into cities and architectural 
innovations of high rises made it possible for more people than 
ever to occupy a given area of land.  This increase in population 
density leads to an increase in demand for desirable property, 
including beachfront property.  Properties along the beachfront 
were packaged up and bought and sold for top dollar, leaving the 
city in only possession of a limited number of municipal beaches.  
Cities, however, are not only home to the rich who are willing to 
pay top dollar to live there.  Political developments, including 
the construction of public housing and funding of subsidized 
housing, allowed the extremely poor to live in the same cities as 
the extremely wealthy (albeit in completely separate 
neighborhoods).  Alexander elaborated on the societal pressures 
at play in Matthews and Raleigh: 
 
Imagine you are single parent living in a public 
housing project in Camden, New Jersey.  It is 
August, and your non-air-conditioned apartment 
is sweltering.  You and your five-year-old 
 
1984); Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  While Matthews involved a “quasi-public” 
property owner, the expansion of the public trust doctrine was held to apply to 
privately-owned beaches as well in Raleigh.  Raleigh, 851 A.2d at 20 (holding 
private beach club could not limit public’s access to dry sand portions of beach 
for “intermittent recreational purposes connected with the ocean and wet sand 
. . . .”). 
226. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 360.  This principle originated from Roman 
jurisprudence, which held that “the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea . . . were common to mankind” by the laws 
of nature.  Id. (quoting JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. 
ed. 1876)). 
227. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 
A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
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daughter would very much like to spend the day 
at the beach.  You take the bus (you have no car) 
on the long ride to the stop on the New Jersey 
shore nearest your home.  The beach there is 
privately owned, and the nearest public beach is 
several miles away, inaccessible by public 
transportation.  The beach in front of you is 
beautiful.  It is also empty because the owner 
works in New York City and visits his beach home 
only sporadically.  You might try to trespass and 
perhaps get away with it, but reluctantly, (and 
much to the chagrin of your hot and cranky 
daughter) you choose to obey the law and take the 
long bus ride back to Camden.228 
 
Society changed.  With the rise in urbanization, the availability 
of public lands, particularly beaches, grew more and more 
limited.  As a response to these societal changes, the court 
chiseled away at the right to exclude.  These cases are but a few 
examples of the default right to exclude and right to exclusive 
use conforming to changes in environmental and social 
conditions to produce a property law better fit for our current 
society. 
The right to exclude and the right to exclusive use have 
become default rules in our property system.  These rules are 
products of evolution to which we can assign no normative value.  
Evolution, however, merely produces “good enough” results.  
With the development of the human intellect and the growth of 
society, we can do better than merely rely on these default 
property rules.  Indeed, the environment in which we live today 
is vastly different from environment in which the deference-to-
possessor evolutionary strategy was unconsciously developed in 
the state of nature.  As information theorists argue, property 
rules perform an important function of communicating 
information to duty-holders; however, this need not be property’s 
only function.229  We currently live in a country where there is a 
 
228. The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 16, at 805. 
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around a traditional conception of property, the cost of such a shift may 
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great chasm between the rich and the poor, where the average 
C.E.O. makes 340 times that of an average worker, and where a 
full-time worker making minimum wage cannot afford a two-
bedroom apartment in any city.  The evolutionary default 
property rules may no longer be ideal for the complexities in our 
modern society, thus property law cannot remain a static set of 
rules, but must respond to societal pressures.  Understanding 
the evolutionary origins of our property rules should empower 
lawmakers and legal scholars to re-imagine and redesign 
property rules to better fit our current society.  To what end 
depends on what it is we value as a society. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
Ownership—at least in its primitive form—is a concept that 
likely emerged as an unconscious, evolutionarily advantageous 
strategy.  Animals that evolved to respect ownership fared better 
in evolutionary terms than those that did not.  Animal displays 
of ownership include strong rights to exclude and exclusive use, 
two rights that are still foundational to our American property 
system.  Given the scientific recognition of the role of evolution 
in human behavior and the similarities between animal displays 
of ownership and the default rules of our property system, 
evolutionary forces have likely shaped human behavior. 
Evolution does not promise optimal solutions, but merely 
good enough results based on historic environmental conditions.  
Displays of ownership likely emerged in our evolutionary 
ancestors eons ago, when the world was vastly different than it 
is today.  Our current property system favors a small proportion 
of people in our society at the expense of the majority.  In order 
to achieve a system of property law that is better tailored to our 
modern society, the law should be allowed to respond more 
effectively to our current needs. 
 
outweigh the benefits.  This article does not argue against the piecemeal 
change that has historically occurred in the law.  This article argues that these 
piecemeal changes should be embraced by society because they help mold the 
antiquated evolutionary understanding of property into a system that better 
fits our modern-day needs. 
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